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Recent reform in Burma has challenged the idea that democratic institutions and the 2008 
Burmese Constitution are an empty facade for an authoritarian military government.  
Burma’s minorities, which have been in conflict with the national government since 
independence in 1948, remain skeptical of recent reforms and continue to call for a 
“return to Panglong,” a 1947 agreement to provide autonomy and self-government for 
ethnic minority regions.  Minority groups have consistently demanded federal institutions 
to protect their rights, and many scholars have advocated an ethnofederal accommodation 
of Burma’s minorities.  However, quasi-federal arrangements failed to accommodate 
ethnic demands during the country’s first democratic period from 1947–62. To assess the 
possibility that recent reforms will be more successful, this thesis conducts a comparative 
study of institutional arrangements to protect minorities in the 1947 and 2008 
constitutions. These arrangements are evaluated against the criteria for successful 
ethnofederal models, such as those offered by Alfred Stepan.  Similarities between the 
initial democratic period and the current one do not inspire optimism, and evaluations 
using Stepan’s criteria and variables further discredit the 2008 Constitution as the basis of 
a federal state.  Peace between Burma’s ethnicities does not completely rest upon the 
structures of government, but this thesis concludes that any such peace will not be a result 
of ethnofederalism based on the current Burmese Constitution. 
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A. Major Research Question 
In 2010, after nearly four decades of authoritarian rule, Burma’s military rulers 
began to take dramatic and unexpected steps toward democracy. They adopted a new 
constitution, held elections, and allowed previously jailed opposition members—
including Aung San Suu Kyi—to take part in politics. The United States and other 
Western countries, which had shunned and isolated the Burmese regime, warmly 
welcomed these reforms.  
However, it appears that few steps have been taken to address the deep ethnic 
division between the country’s Burman majority and its numerous minority groups. The 
2008 Constitution provides autonomy, but it is essentially an empty shell, rendering 
regional legislatures powerless in comparison to the regional executives that remain 
centrally appointed. Since independence in 1948, the national government has frequently 
faced armed rebellions by minority groups located along the country’s borders. Today, 
ceasefire agreements, rather than actual peace, still characterize most minority groups’ 
relationships with the central government.1  As a result, the government’s authority in 
many regions remains limited. Reports of human rights abuses, violence, and even open 
conflict between the government and ethnic separatist groups continue, despite recent 
government pledges to curtail them.2  
As recent events show, democratization alone is unlikely to accommodate the 
demands of Burma’s minorities. The problem, as Donald Horowitz warns, is that “much 
of what passes for the usual democratic rules either does nothing about ethnic exclusion 
or actually fosters it.”3 The reason is that “majoritarian” institutions can allow ethnic 
majorities to democratically deny rights to minorities. Alfred Stepan provides an answer 
                                                 
1 Transnational Institute, Prospects for Ethnic Peace and Political Participation in Burma/Myanmar, 
(Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, July 8–9, 2012), 1. 
2 United States Department of State, 2011 Human Rights Reports Burma, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186475.pdf. 
3 Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (1993): 28. 
 2 
to this challenge, claiming the only way for multinational countries including Burma to 
become a democratic state is through “a workable federal system.”4 
So how are likely are Burma’s democratic political institutions, which largely 
resemble federalism, to incorporate the country’s minorities into a stable, consolidated 
democracy? To answer this question, this thesis will compare Burma’s recently adopted 
political institutions to those in place during its previous period of democratic rule (1948-
62) and to Stepan’s model of ethnofederalism. 
B. Importance  
As Khun Okker of the National Democratic Front (NDF) stated in 1996, “The 
issue of democracy is often put before ethnic nationality questions … it needs to come 
first.”5  Nearly twenty years later, the statement still rings true. The crowd gathered at the 
University of Yangon reaffirmed as much by interrupting and applauding U.S. President 
Barack Obama’s remarks that, “No process of reform will succeed without national 
reconciliation.”6  Burma has been beset by ethnic conflict since its independence. The 
initial democratic government set up following WWII proved incapable of peacefully 
accommodating ethnic minorities, and subsequent military-dominated governments 
likewise could not unify it through force. These experiences show that the creation of a 
government in a multi-national state that is sovereign throughout its territory and 
responsive to its inhabitants depends on the development of institutions that can 
accommodate minority interests. Conversely, if Burma fails to develop such institutions, 
ethnic violence is likely to continue, democracy is unlikely to be consolidated, and the 
promise of Burma’s recent reforms will not be achieved. 
                                                 
4 Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and 
Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. 
Gibson, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004): 75. 
5 Martin Smith, “Burma at the Crossroads,” Burma Debate 3, (Nov./Dec. 1996): 8.  
6 U.S. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon,” 
Rangoon, Burma (November 19, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-
president-obama-university-yangon. 
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C. Problems and Hypothesis 
Decades of conflict have institutionalized ethnic conflict within Burma. As Mary 
Callahan and many other scholars describe it, ethnic minorities have come to live in an 
environment that is, at its best, “not quite peace,”7or “neither war nor peace.”8  The 
distrust and hatred resulting from years of fighting present an enormous challenge for any 
government, much less a government that represents the antagonist and perpetrator of the 
conflict in the first place. The challenge of governance in Burma is to establish a 
representative government that commands the respect and allegiance of not just the 
majority Burmans, but also the 135 ethnic minorities that constitute Burma’s seven 
National Races (see Table 1). The vast majority of these distinct ethnicities are regionally 
concentrated and demand varied levels of autonomy and self-governance. (see Figure 1)  
Careful selection of processes and institutions will be necessary in order to accommodate 
the minorities and guarantee participation, rather than secession or open conflict in 
pursuit of independence. 
National Race Ethnicities Included 1983 Census 2000 Estimate 
Burman 9 69.0 66.9 
Shan 33 8.5 10.5 
Kayin (Karen) 11 6.2 6.2 
Rakhine 7 4.5 4.2 
Mon 1 2.4 2.6 
Chin 53 2.2 2.0 
Kachin 12 1.4 1.4 
Kayah (Karenni) 9 0.4 0.4 
Table 1.   Burma’s National Races, Ethnicities, and Population Percentages9 
                                                 
7 Mary P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, 
and Coexistence, (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007). 
8 Tom Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Ceasefire Agreements in Burma, 
Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute (July 2009), 1. 
9 Than, Tin Maung Maung. “Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar 
(Burma).” Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005): 67. 
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Figure 1.  Ethnolinguistic Groups of Burma.10 
                                                 
10 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Zed 




Figure 2.  Burma’s Ethnic States and Ethnic Population Concentrations11 
The atrocities and horrors of Burma’s ethnic conflict are the very kind that has 
compelled scholars and politicians to conceptualize and implement government processes 
                                                 
11 Christians Concerned for Burma Homepage, accessed June 5, 2013, 
http://www.prayforburma.org/IDX/Images/Burma_Map_Sepia.jpg. 
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to avoid or eliminate them. Many different forms of democratic government have been 
suggested for the multi-ethnic state, probably none more so than federalism. Ugo 
Amoretti, in the introduction to Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, calls federalism, 
“the most important of these hypotheses.”12  Drawing on the work of leading scholars of 
federalism William Riker, Robert Dahl, and Arend Lijphart, Amoretti defines federalism 
as “an institutionalized division of power between a central government and a set of 
constituent governments—variously denominated as states, regions, provinces, Länder, or 
cantons—in which each level of government has the power to make final decisions in 
some policy areas but cannot unilaterally modify the federal structure of the state.”13  He 
claims bicameralism, independent justice or arbitration, and some version of 
“antimajoritarian” institutions as integral parts of the central government in federalism.14 
Federalism, and specifically ethnofederalism, by design is intended to combine a 
limited version of self-rule for minorities within a larger political unit. By doing so, it 
offers a semblance of self-determination, and can satisfy demands for ethnic autonomy. 
By surrendering power to the provincial and local region, closer representative ties 
between government and populace are supposed to result. This concept has been at the 
heart of Burmese ethnic politics since Aung San, the father of modern Burma, met with 
ethnic leaders in the town of Panglong in 1947. As a result of this precedent, the concepts 
of autonomy and federalism, rather than secessionism, have populated ethnic demands 
since independence, and those cries continue to this day. Consequently, no discussion of 
democracy or ethnic politics in Burma is complete without federalism, and if federalism 
is a proposed solution for multinational or multi-ethnic countries, how much greater are 
its prospects in a context when it is the preferred and requested solution by ethnic 
minorities to the ethnic problem?   
Federalism offers the basic construct, but as previously mentioned, there is a great 
deal of variance within the model for “antimajoritarian” institutions that Stepan refers to 
                                                 
12 Ugo M. Amoretti, Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, ed. Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 9. 
13 Ibid., 9. 
14 Ibid., 9–11. 
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as “demos-constraining.”15  The point here is simple enough: altering the details of a 
federal system can amplify or temper the majority constraining effects of federalism. 
Simply importing a common federalist structure, such as that of the U.S., is not sufficient 
to combat the dangers of democracy in multinational countries. It would be similar to a 
doctor prescribing treatment for a patient without first inquiring as the medical history or 
allergic reactions that may endanger the patient. Rash territorial accommodation in a 
multinational country can be just as disastrous. The “tyranny of the majority,” in this case 
the Burman majority, could be constrained by federal construction, but the extent to 
which it accomplishes that aim depends greatly on electoral processes, constitutional 
provisions and consociational arrangements.16 
Burmese minorities have historically rejected many national institutions simply 
due to a lack of representation within those institutions. This was true of the initial 
rebellions against the Burmese state following independence.  “Forces unwilling to 
accept their exclusion from state power in 1948 launched the civil war in an attempt to 
achieve political power.”17  Within a few years, the state was facing multiple ethnic 
rebellions, despite constitutional provisions for those ethnic groups’ autonomy. The point 
here is both historically and currently relevant: while federalism may guarantee the 
autonomy that ethnic minorities desire, allegiance and participation in the central 
government remains crucial to democratic stability in Burma.   
Federalism only becomes a viable solution to Burma’s ethnic division if it is 
combined with constitutionally guaranteed inclusion and influence in the central 
government. This correlates with Stepan’s assertion that federalism can only exist under 
the auspices of a constitutional democracy. Stepan shares Dahl’s federal definition of 
federalism, and in doing so mandates the connection to democracy.  “Only a system that 
is a democracy,” he claims, “can build the autonomous constitutional, legislative, and 
                                                 
15 Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,” 46–49. 
16 Amoretti, Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, 10. 
17 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 228. 
 8 
judicial systems necessary to meet the Dahlian requirements for a federation.”18  It is not 
enough that ethnicities are simply given their own territory and some type of autonomy 
within it. Instead, Dahlian standards of democracy (effective participation, voting 
equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusiveness of adults) 
remain crucial to the design of a federal system. The accommodation of Burma’s 
minorities depends not only on an ethnofederal structure, but also on a democracy 
specifically inclusive of minorities to support it. 
D. Literature Review 
Federalism’s roots are often traced back to the U.S. Constitution and the 
Federalist Papers written by American founding fathers Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, and John Jay. Indeed, one of the most well-known concepts concerning 
federalism comes from Federalist 10 and James Madison’s warnings, inspired by 
Tocqueville and Adams, in which he warned against the possible tyranny of the majority 
within democracy. Stepan, as noted above, acknowledges this influence in what he calls 
“coming together” societies, such as the United States, that lack territorially concentrated 
ethnic minorities, and have a willingness to pool resources and sovereignty. Stepan, 
however, expands the model to point out federalism’s alternate capacity to “hold-
together” an ethnically fractured country, thus drawing the important connection between 
federalism, and ethnic nationalism. The connection of federalism and nationalism is, he 
argues, emphatically important for the survival of democracy in multi-ethnic countries: 
“Every single longstanding democracy in a multilingual and multinational polity is a 
federal state.”19 
Democratic institutions can further manipulate majoritarian influence on a scale 
between “demos-enabling” and “demos-constraining.” This description is particularly 
useful in presenting the impact institutional intricacies can have within a federal system 
to alter the influence of a majority. Federalism itself has this effect, but as Stepan puts it: 
                                                 
18 Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,” 32. 
19 Alfred C. Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” 19. 
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“democratic federations can and do vary immensely in the degree to which they are 
“demos constraining.”20  Stepan emphasizes distinct choices and variables within the 
structure of federalism that can greatly alter the liberty, equality, and efficacy that 
democratic government can provide.21 
Nancy Bermeo, a contributor to and co-editor with Ugo Amoretti of the 
previously mentioned book on federalism, further examined relationship between 
federalism and ethnic violence in a 2002 essay.  Drawing on Stepan’s ideas as well as 
data presented by Ted Robert Gurr in Minorities at Risk, she emphasized that federal 
systems are more successful at preventing or mitigating armed rebellion, political and 
economic discrimination, as well as political, economic, and cultural grievances.22  Her 
advocacy of ethnofederalism comes with one caution, however:  imposed federal 
systems, either by a third party or by a non-democratic government lead to failure of the 
federal structure or of the government all together. Her warnings draw our attention to the 
undemocratic way in which Burma’s constitution was drafted and institutionalized. 
Not all of the study and literature surrounding federalism’s application to multi-
ethnic countries is as optimistic. Philip G. Roeder’s paper on Ethnofederalism and the 
Mismanagement of Nationalism, asserts that separations between communities and 
nations within the state encourage conflict and discourage attachment to the state.23  Jack 
Snyder agrees, and backs up his opinion by outlining the poor historical performance of 
all ethnofederal states.  Snyder also argues that pre-conditions, such as an established 
middle class and active civil society, are more important than the institutional choices for 
ultimately stabilizing democracy.24  Such pre-conditions are rarely choices available to 
multi-national, divided societies such as Burma.  Additionally, while there are many 
                                                 
20 Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,” 49. 
21 Ibid., 44–45, 52–53. 
22 Nancy Gina Bermeo,. “The Import of Institutions.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 96–
110. 
23 Philip G. Roeder, “Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms.” 
Regional and Federal Studies 19, no. 2 (2009): 203–219. 
24 Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. (New York: 
Norton, 2000). 
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examples of failed democracy and federalism, the focus should not be the 
disappointments, but instead, as Stepan asserts, upon the success stories and the lessons 
that can be drawn from them.25  Authors such as John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary 
offer a nuanced criticism of federalism, ultimately concluding that voluntary participation 
in a multi-state federation that includes a dominant ethnic majority and reinforced by 
consociational practices stands the best chance of success.26 
Apart from general literature focused on the institutions themselves, Burma’s long 
history, which includes initial attempts at democracy in the 1940s following WWII and 
British decolonization, has provided the opportunity for evaluation and critique of 
Burma’s institutions, or those that might be applied to it. Burma’s tumultuous past can be 
divided into a few distinct eras. The first, from 1948 until 1962, was the initial Burmese 
attempt at democracy, as well as federalism, though not specifically by that name. In only 
a short few years, civil war engulfed Burma, due to both communist insurgency and 
armed ethnic groups. The invasion of the Kuomintang (KMT), retreating from China, 
further added to the chaos. During this time, however, multi-party elections were held at 
four-year intervals in 1952, 1956, and 1960, and the constitution provided for an 
incomplete but distinctly federal construction, in keeping with the Panglong agreement. 
Toward the end of that initial democratic period, Josef Silverstein, a long-time Burma 
scholar, questioned the effectiveness of that federal model. Silverstein argued in 1959 
that while the structure was properly in place, certain policies, namely “forced 
Burmanization,” which equated to forced assimilation, countered the accommodative 
structure of the government.27 
The coup of 1962 by General Ne Win ended the federal democratic experiment in 
Burma. The constitution was abolished and a unitary state was created under military 
rule. The Burmese military, known officially as tatmawdaw, fronted its control of the 
                                                 
25 Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” 19. 
26 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. “Must Pluri-national Federations Fail?” Ethnopolitics 8, no. 1 
(2009): 25. 
27 Josef Silverstein, “The Federal Dilemma in Burma.” Far Eastern Survey (1959): 97–105, quote 
105. 
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government with a political party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), a trend 
that continues to this day. Much of the literature from the next quarter century focused 
upon the atrocities of civil war, and the plights of minorities within the government. 
Robert H. Taylor’s The State in Burma, serves as a foundational work for the 
development of the state as far back as pre-colonial history, but is especially useful in its 
focus on the state during the democratic and military junta eras.   
Several other authoritative works focus on the ethnic conflict during these 
periods, most notably Mary Callahan’s Making Enemies, War and State Building in 
Burma, and Martin Smith’s Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. These books 
are vital to understanding the magnitude of the division and distrust built up through 
years of conflict and brutal authoritative rule. Callahan describes brutality of the 
violence: “BIA (Burma Independence Army) units executed Karen men, women, and 
children and arrested whole villages simply for being Karen,”28  Similarly, Smith 
describes the military’s counterinsurgency plan called the “Four Cuts” campaign, which 
sought to starve the rebellions from food, funds, intelligence, and recruits.29  Ethnically 
focused publications, such as those produced by the Karen Human Rights Group, focused 
upon the human rights abuses suffered by minorities at the hands of the tatmawdaw. 
Accounts of murder, torture, rape, pillaging, and forced labor understandably brought 
world-wide condemnation, and resulted in the longstanding economic sanctions and 
isolation. 
Burmese democratic activists perceived potential cracks in the military’s hold on 
government when Ne Win stepped down in 1988, inspiring popular political 
demonstrations and the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, modern 
Burma’s founding father, as a democracy activist and leading opposition figure against 
the government. The protests were suppressed, and Suu Kyi was imprisoned, quickly 
crushing both domestic and international optimism. The changes in Burma did not come 
from popular unrest, but from within the government itself, as a new standard 
                                                 
28 Callahan, Making Enemies, 75. 
29 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 258–62. 
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relationship emerged between the government and minority opposition groups. Years of 
fighting had not successfully unified the country, nor had it consolidated sovereignty for 
the military government to the extent of Burmese borders, but it had placed the ethnic 
militias in a state of “battle fatigue” and established the tatmawdaw as the superior armed 
force within Burma. This dynamic, coupled with democratic unrest from within the 
Burman majority, encouraged the cessation of conflict, and the result was that ceasefires 
were negotiated with the majority of minorities.  A booklet published by Zaw Oo and 
Win Min in 2007 thoroughly examines those ceasefires, and includes valuable 
perspectives from the minority groups.30 
Ceasefires became the new normal in Burma, but never progressed all the way to 
actual peace, and led observers to use the previously mentioned phrases, “not quite 
peace,” and “neither war nor peace.”  In 2003, however, the government announced 
“seven future policies of the State,” which would later become known as the Seven Step 
Roadmap to Democracy. The program was met with worldwide skepticism and even 
outright dismissal as design to “entrench tatmawdaw power behind a façade of 
democracy.”31 While some optimism might have surfaced following the surprisingly free 
and fair elections of 2008, in which the primary opposition, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD), won a stunning victory, the hope of democratic activists was dashed 
as the government reduced the assembly to a constitutional drafting and recommendation 
council.   The 2008 referendum on the proposed constitution, which was written by the 
government with overt efforts to entrench tatmawdaw power within it, passed with 
overtly rigged electoral processes, leading Ian Holliday to call it “sham democracy.”32 
Likewise, both Steinberg and Smith, writing in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, 
                                                 
30 Zaw Oo and Win Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, (Singapore: Washington, DC: East-
West Center, 2007), 53. 
31 Ian Holliday, “Voting and Violence in Myanmar: Nation Building for a Transition to Democracy,” 
Asian Survey 47, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2006): 1045. 
32 Ibid., 1045. 
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claimed that the elections and the process were unlikely to change the balance of power 
that was so heavily tilted in the tatmawdaw’s favor.33 
Pessimistic attitudes aside, the commitment to a constitution, flawed or not, once 
again encouraged discourse domestically and internationally about the prospects for 
democratization and institutions that would facilitate it. For example, the Legal Issues on 
Burma Journal published a special issue that focused on the prospects of federalism and 
constitutional democracy. Silverstein took the opportunity forty-three years later to once 
again explore the possibilities of a federal government in Burma. His conclusion is 
optimistic as to federalism’s potential, citing minority groups’ desire for it since 
Panglong, but he is also decidedly pessimistic about the government’s commitment to 
peace and political competition necessary to implement it.34 
At about the same time, Stepan joined the debate about political reform in Burma. 
In a co-authored article entitled, “How Burma Could Democratize,” Stepan and his 
colleagues critiqued proposals made by both the National Convention, controlled by the 
military-backed government, and by the National Council of the Union of Burma 
(NCUB), which represented several ethnic minorities. Like Silverstein, these authors saw 
great prospects for ethnofederalism, given the minorities’ affection for the principle. But 
they were also encouraged to see that the government had incorporated federalism into its 
own constitutional drafts as well. Ultimately, however the same caution emerges here that 
is included in Stepan’s general works: “If Burma is to be a coherent democracy, it will 
need institutions that work to foster such a sense of partnership and mutual confidence 
among Burmans and non-Burmans alike.”35 
These views about federalism reflected widespread concern about continuing 
conflict between minorities and the national government. Zaw Oo and Win Min’s book 
                                                 
33 David I. Steinberg, “Myanmar in 2010,” 173; Martin Smith, “Ethnic Politics in Myanmar: A Year 
of Tension and Anticipation,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2010): 214. 
34 Josef Silverstein, “Federalism as a Solution to the Ethnic Problem in Burma,” Legal Issues on 
Burma Journal 11, (2002). 
35 Andrew Reynolds, Alfred C. Stepan, Zaw Oo, and Stephen I. Levine. “How Burma Could 
Democratize.” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 4 (2001): 107–08. 
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2007 publication on Burma’s ceasefires was accompanied by new works from Smith 
(2007), Callahan (2007), and Ashley South (2008). Callahan focused her booklet entitled 
Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and 
Coexistence upon the varying levels of state influence throughout the minority regions. 
She describes some regions as almost completely autonomous, with minority based 
schools and infrastructure, while others remain conflict ridden or under direct oppressive 
tatmawdaw control.   
In State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Smith presents 
Burma’s conflict and ceasefire history as a “cycle of conflict,” trapping Burma in 
interminable waves of violence that can only be escaped through specific reforms and 
changes that meet the regional political demands within Burma, and guarantee political 
and human rights. Ashley South examines Burma’s potential for a “bottom up” 
democratic transition in Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy amidst 
Conflict, and ultimately concludes that while grassroots democracy is certainly present, 
the government’s manipulation of conflict and ceasefires prevents popular influence and 
forces the prospects for democracy back on the government itself. 
The elections of 2010 were widely viewed as neither free nor fair. Aung San Suu 
Kyi and her opposition party, the NLD, were prevented from participating by the 
government, and the military’s political party, the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) claimed an emphatic victory. While the exclusion of the NLD drew worldwide 
protest, many scholars were attracted to the participation of Burma’s minorities. 
Silverstein, Smith, and Tin Maung Maung Than all recognized the high ethnic 
participation in the absence of the NLD. The Transnational Institute (TNI) in the 
Netherlands focused on this ethnic participation, noting that “ethnic parties fared better 
than other opposition parties,” and representation in four of the ethnic state legislatures 
crossed a twenty five percent threshold, thereby providing additional powers and political 
influence. It emphasizes that mechanically, the participation of ethnicities did little to 
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counter the military and SPDC dominance, but that the presence and participation is an 
important precedence in contrast to the preceding decades of violence and opposition.36 
The prior history and literature associated with it leads to the current-day reaction 
to reforms and political change. The by-elections in 2012 in which Aung San Suu Kyi 
and her party members won 43 of the 45 contested seats were for the most part free and 
fair, and suggested a genuine democratic transition might actually be underway. This 
election, along with liberal political and economic reforms, has many hopeful of 
democratic consolidation even in light of the 2008 constitution’s democratic 
shortcomings. Observers are just starting to come to grasp with the meaning of these 
recent developments, but publications from the TNI and the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) have emphasized the absence of peace between ethnic minorities and the national 
government. In particular, they have called attention to the renewed conflict between the 
military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the continued expulsion of 
Muslim Rohingya in the Southwest. Additionally, the TNI emphasizes a growing fear of 
the 2014 census and 2015 election as opportunities for a Burman majority to empower 
itself through democracy.37 
Recent attention to federalism has been overshadowed by a focus on political 
liberalization and human rights. The impending census and election will attract additional 
and well-deserved attention, but the structure of the government may well decide the 
potential for democratic consolidation that accommodates and includes Burma’s 
minorities. Burma’s minorities have requested a return to the “spirit of Panglong” for 
years. They are effectively calling for ethnofederalism, and the potential behind that 
request prompts this thesis. 
E. Methods and Sources 
This thesis will examine the political institutions adopted in Burma during two 
different eras and assess how closely they match the ideal institutions of democratic 
                                                 
36 Transnational Institute, A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma’s 2010 Polls, Burma 
Policy Briefing No. 4 (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, December 2010), 5. 
37 Transnational Institute, Prospects for Ethnic Peace, 2. 
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ethnofederalism.  In addition, it will examine the failure of those institutions during the 
earlier era (1948-62), and attempt to assess the possibility that recently adopted 
institutions will succeed.  
The country’s pre-colonial and colonial history is rife with ethnic relationship 
precedents.  Those relationships which helped form the distinct identities of Burma’s 
ethnicities and encouraged federal choices upon independence will be reviewed.  The 
initial democracy period following independence in 1948 was largely federalist in 
structure, yet proved incapable of unifying the country and preventing ethnic conflict. 
The initial agreement at Panglong, the constitution of 1947, and the subsequent 
fragmenting of the democratic state will serve as a historical case study to which the 
principles and structures of contemporary ethnofederalism can be compared. That 
comparison will allow us to draw some conclusions regarding the practicality of 
federalism in Burma and the complete or incomplete nature of ethnofederalism in that 
constitution and government. 
Similarly, the 2008 constitution, which defines the current Burmese government 
practices and structures, will be put to the ethnofederal test. Its structure and provisions 
for ethnic autonomy will be compared against the historical example of the previous era 
and contemporary literature on ethnofederalism. These two cases will provide the 
background for understanding Burma’s ethnic divisions, as well as ethnofederalism’s 
prospects and potential for solving them. 
In addition to the sources listed in the literature review, this thesis will use 
regional archived news media, including but not limited to The Irrawaddy, Mizzima, The 
Democratic Voice of Burma, and The Singapore Straits Times to obtain the quotes and 
perspectives of ethnic minority groups. Additionally, the state-controlled New Light of 
Myanmar will serve as a source of information about government programs and 
propaganda. An English translation of the 1947 and 2008 constitutions in addition to 
several other archived primary sources were drawn from the Online Burma Library 
(www.burmalibrary.org). 
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F. Thesis overview 
This chapter has described the main research question, problem, and hypothesis, 
and has reviewed the main literature on ethnofederalism and Burmese politics. Chapter II 
will examine Burma’s pre-colonial and colonial history, focusing on the origins of the 
country’s deep ethnic differences, and on the emergence of its main political institutions. 
Chapter III will be a case study of the initial democratic period of Burma beginning with 
an analysis of the 1947 constitution and meetings at Panglong, and concluding with the 
collapse of democratic federalism in the coup d’état of 1962. Chapter IV will similarly 
study the 2008 constitution and the contemporary government structure of Burma. It will 
follow the outline of the previous chapter and will identify potential shortcomings in the 
ethnofederal structure of the Burmese government through comparisons to the previous 
period and to ideal ethnofederal institutions as defined in the literature reviewed above. 
The fifth and final chapter will draw conclusions and implications from the findings from 
the case studies. 
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II. ETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS IN BURMA’S PAST 
A. Introduction 
Burma’s ethnicities were forced to interact long before the Constitution of 1947. 
The history of those relationships is not explicitly referred to within the constitution, but 
they constitute the basis on which the institutional decisions contained within it were 
made. Even before the colonial era, Burma’s ethnicities were engaged in a relationship in 
which an ethnically Burman central government maintained sovereignty throughout 
much of modern day Burma. The Burman empires directly governed and managed 
central Burma but interfered little with the governance and administration of its 
peripheral subjects. The British colonial era and Japanese occupation would reinforce the 
divergent depth of governance between center and periphery, while enmeshing them with 
modern political structures that would influence governance decisions made in the 
attempt to unify the country under an independent Burmese government. This chapter 
will highlight those relationships, illustrating the historical coexistence of a strong central 
government surrounded by regions that are ethnically different and politically 
autonomous.  
European imperialism receives well deserved blame in the failing and floundering 
states that resulted from former colonies. But while British-colonized Burma is no 
exception to this phenomenon, it is short sighted to limit oneself to the colonial history of 
Burma in the search for the patterns of cooperation and conflict in Burma’s ethnic past. 
Nation states may have been a new concept, imported by European imperialism into 
Southeast Asia, but ethnically homogenous kingdoms and communities were forced to 
interact long before the British arrived. Therefore, even such a contemporary idea as 
federalism cannot ignore pre-colonial ethnic relationships in its assessment of influential 
historical relationships and interaction. Both the pre-colonial and British-colonial era 
presented here demonstrate the long and established history of ethnic division and 
devolved authority contributing to the implementation of federalist principles within 
Burma. 
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B. Ethnicity, Core and Tributary: The Pre-Colonial Relationships 
Pre-colonial imperialism within Burma presents a valuable understanding of the 
governmental structures and relationships of the dominant Burman kingdoms and the 
ethnic minorities surrounding it. This section focuses upon pre-colonial Burma, focusing 
on the three major Burman empires, the Pagan, Konbaung, and Toungoo. While the 
interaction between these kingdoms and their peripheral subjects was not federal, there 
are characteristics of the relationship that justify and inspire the federal desires of 
Burma’s minorities in the present day. Simply put, Burma’s periphery became 
accustomed to a strong and sovereign central Burman government that demanded 
allegiance and monetary dues, but interfered little with the culture, language or 
administration of their people. Conversely, the Burman center came to enjoy 
unquestioned dominance throughout Burma with a dependence on the taxes and 
remittances of its peripheral subject. As a result, cultural and administrative autonomy for 
Burma’s minorities has pre-colonial roots. 
 Prior to the British arrival in 1825, Burma was, as Taylor describes it, 
“patrimonial.”38  Beginning with the kingdom of Pagan in AD 849 and ending with the 
Konbaung dynasty that ultimately succumbed to British conquest, Burma was 
consistently characterized by central Burman dominance, which compelled tribute and 
allegiance from its neighboring ethnicities, communities, and territories. The scope of 
that influence depended not upon borders but upon the strength of the central kingdom in 
comparison with the societies that surrounded it. At its height of power, the king’s 
influence was great enough to sack the Siam capital Ayutthaya nearly 1,000 miles away, 
but at its depths it would struggle to maintain control of lands less than 150 miles from 
the capital, or give way to a new dynasty altogether.39  Extensive bureaucratic institutions 
were impractical given the dynamic nature of the dynasties’ influence. Instead, the king 
preferred to appoint officials to oversee the remittance of tribute back to the capital, and 
maintained a limited influence and devolved power relationship. 
                                                 
38 Taylor, The State in Burma, 15. 
39 Ibid., 21–22 
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Figure 3.  The Extents of the Toungoo Empire in 1580 (From Wikipedia, “Burma”) 
The Pagan, Konbaung, and Toungoo dynasties similarly organized their kingdoms 
into territorial categories that defined each area’s relationship to the state. There were 
slight variances between the dynasties, but each dynasty similarly had a power and 
influence that was administratively invasive locally, but decreased in influence with 
increased distance from the capitol. The basis for power was built upon the local Burman 
population, and from that base expanded outward to different degrees upon the 
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neighboring villages, communities and ethnic homelands that included the Shan, Kachin, 
Karenni40, Karen, and Chin.41   
The center, described by Taylor as the “nuclear zone,” was under direct rule from 
the king and served as his primary source of wealth, food, and labor. Beyond this nucleus 
lay the “dependent provinces,” where the myo-wun, the bureaucratic officials appointed 
by the king, and represented his interests in those provinces. Further still were the 
tributaries of which Taylor’s description is particularly useful: Here immediate authority 
was exercised by hereditary rulers from a variety of cultural and ethnic backgrounds. The 
relationship between the kingdom and the tributaries could just as well be characterized 
as an ethnic interaction as much as a regional one. The people living in the periphery 
were not compelled or encouraged to identify with the core, so they remained tied to their 
local tribes and villages that would become the base of Burmese ethnicities. The ethnic 
rulers, Shan Sawbwas, Kachin Duwas, Karenni Sawbwas, Karen and Chin chiefs, etc., 
paid allegiance to the central court through tribute missions, marriage alliances, military 
forces, and similar non-permanent, non-bureaucratic displays of obligation. As long as 
these tributaries posed no serious threat to the central state, kings allowed them to 
conduct their affairs undisturbed.”42 Pagan and Toungoo kings alike appointed their own 
representatives to oversee the tributary process and ensure the flow of money back to the 
kingdom, but they left village chiefs in charge of populace and resources alike. In reality, 
the centrally appointed officials were little more than middlemen, who as Silverstien 
points out, were often “inferior to the chieftains.”43  The people continued to exist and 
identify themselves as separate from the central government. 
The local authority, often referred to as a chief or Sawbwa, was the authoritative 
voice in his village and region. Sir Charles Crosthwaite, the  Chief Commissioner of the 
                                                 
40 The Karenni people were later referred to as the Kayeh in a 1951 Amendment to the 1947 
Constitution of the Union of Burma. For the purpose of clarity, only the name, Karenni, will be used in this 
thesis. 
41 Taylor, The State in Burma, 22, 33. 
42 Ibid., 22. 
43 Josef Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977, 7; Taylor, The State in Burma, 27. 
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British Crown Colony of Burma from 1887–1890, described the Shan Sawbwa exercising 
his authority under the Konbuang kingdom as having “the power of life and death, and so 
far as his subjects were concerned, [he] wielded absolute authority unfettered by any rule 
stronger than custom.”44  From Crosthwaite’s observance, “the Burma Government did 
not scruple to interfere with the Sawbwa.” The Burmese king had neither the resources, 
nor a perceived benefit from increased meddling in the local politics of his ethnic 
neighbors. Local, ethnic-specific customs still governed the administration of each 
community and region, and in general, life in the tributaries was normally, “avoidance of 
the state, not appeal to it.”45 
The relationship that existed between the dominant center and the peripheral 
communities is worth emphasizing. The monarch commanded tribute and 
acknowledgement from areas that fell under his influence, but he demanded and received 
little else. Central dominance did not interfere culturally, administratively, or judicially. 
While center appointed officials held official positions in the tributaries, they had little 
tangible power. The true governance of each community and ethnic population remained 
in the hands of the local ethnic chiefs. The minorities in Burma were accustomed to a 
political relationship that had a high degree of autonomy, yet willingly sacrificed 
sovereignty to a strong unchallenged central authority. 
C. British Colonialism 
1. The Institutionalized Divergence of Burma Proper and the Frontier 
Areas 
The description of pre-colonial Burma is not intended to mask the sweeping social 
and political changes that came about as a result of British. While initial British interest 
in Burma resulted from security concerns on the border of the invaluable Indian colony, 
the final Anglo-Burmese war in 1885 conclusively ended the rule of the Burman monarch 
in Burma, and established the region as another source of wealth and resource extraction 
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for the British colonial empire. In the years that followed, British rule institutionalized 
that which the Burman kings had effectively created. This section will illustrate the 
continued dichotomy between the now British dominated center and the ethnic minority 
populated periphery. The administrative and cultural autonomy of the periphery will not 
only be sustained by the British, but institutionalized.   
British conquest had several effects on Burma. While introducing a foreign power 
as the new sovereign ruler over the territory, it delineated static and permanent 
boundaries, which created an entirely new entity and identity for many within its borders. 
Through the use of a force larger and more technologically advanced than previously 
seen, Burma was pacified and unified, including areas, specifically in the western Arakan 
region, that had not previously been under Myanmar kings’ influence.46 Ethnic 
populations such as the Arakanese, which had never submitted to a Burman authority, 
and had little cultural or linguistically similarities with the Burman people, were now 
technically and permanently Burmese. 
British conquest also brought about typical colonial aspects of governance. The 
colonial state was as Taylor describes it, “artificial,” due to the emphasis the freedom of 
trade, and the generation of wealth as primary aims. Freedom of the marketplace was also 
considered altruistic, as there was a modernization side to British extraction, and the 
belief that replacing the previous economy and social order improved the lives of their 
colonial subjects, rather an disrupting them. Despite these beliefs, the welfare of the 
Burmese populace was insignificant in comparison to the importance of wealth extraction 
and the security necessary to facilitate it. What was “good” for the Burmese was decided 
primarily without Burmese input, and often decided outside its borders in neighboring 
India. The average Burmese resident initially had little influence or participation with the 
colonial government.47  
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Press, 2005), 78. 
47 Taylor, The State in Burma, 68–69. 
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In terms of governance, the British had the power and resources to push their 
influence throughout the territory in ways the previous Burman dynasties could not. As a 
result, there was a capacity to become more centralized and organized than ever before. 
This capacity primarily manifested itself within the core region, employing great numbers 
of imported Indian civil servants in the effort to bureaucratize and administer the 
agriculturally rich center. The same cannot be said of the administrative zones, which the 
British kept administratively unchanged. Sir Charles Haukes Todd Crosthwaite, the Chief 
Commissioner of the British Crown Colony of Burma from March of 1887 to December 
of 1890, described the system that was run by the Toungoo dynasty as honestly and fairly 
done.  “It was not a bad system on the whole, and it was in its incidence probably just as 
local taxation is in Great Britain.”48  Given this viewpoint, it is hardly surprising that the 
British simply adopted the Burman imperialist model. Rather than introducing the 
instability of new relationships and committing the increased resources necessary to 
enforce them, the British chose to renew the previous arrangements. 
The British also chose to retain the territorial difference between the core, which 
it called “Burma Proper” and was predominantly populated by the Burmans, and the 
“Frontier,” that had previously been the ethnically diverse tributary states. The Burmese 
Frontier was not expected, nor required to participate in a larger Burmese government. 
On the contrary, the surrounding tributary states remained “quasi-independent.”49 The 
Shan, Karenni, and Kachin all enjoyed a continuance of the monarchical arrangement, 
with the Karenni “retaining nominal sovereignty until Burma’s independence in 1948.”50   
In effect, “The British raj merely replaced the king of Burma as the suzerain to whom the 
chiefs paid allegiance through tribute.”51 
Crosthwaite’s memoirs explicitly describe the colonial-peripheral relationship, 
predominantly through the interactions with the Shan Sawbwas, where Taylor asserts the 
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most advanced Burmese political structures were in place.52  Crosthwaite recalls: “I 
pointed out to them that they, the Shan chiefs, had duties and obligations on their side: 
primarily the good government of their peoples, the impartial administration of justice, 
the development of their territories by roads, and the improvement of agriculture and 
trade. Lastly, I explained to them that they could not be excused from paying tribute, the 
amount of which would be adjusted to their ability. The British Government was 
maintaining garrisons for their benefit, and had undertaken costly expenditures for their 
defense… It was necessary to ask them to remember their obligations.”53 
The devolved power relationship now also came with legal formalities. The Shan 
Sawbwas “each had received a patent confirming him in his rights and position as head of 
his State.”  It was mutually beneficial. By leaving the local authorities intact, the British 
maintained order by the most frugal methods, while the chiefs sacrificed ultimate 
sovereignty for localized influence. From the Sawbwas perspective, the only change was 
the benefactor. In most cases, the initial required remittance amount was based solely 
upon the previous arrangement with the pre-colonial king.54  The same was true in the 
Karenni region, and while the rest of the Frontier areas lagged behind, notably including 
a brief resistance that took the British five years to ultimately pacify, they did not greatly 
diverge from the model.55 
Understanding British objectives as a colonial ruler facilitates an understanding of 
their actions. British governors desired law and order throughout the country to facilitate 
extraction of resources and wealth from those areas that were profitable. To achieve these 
ends, the British treated each region differently. In the center, it was necessary to 
completely remove Burman authority and establish a strong bureaucratic organization 
populated by imported Indian labor. Traditional elements of the colonial state focused on 
resource and wealth extraction dominated the agriculturally rich lowlands that comprised 
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most of Burma Proper.56  In the 1940s, years to define a time frame are plural not 
possessive. roughly fifty years after deposing the Burman king, the British bureaucracy 
for the Frontier Areas had only forty employees, emphasizing the lack of colonial interest 
in interfering in the government and administration of those regions.57 
Even as diarchy introduced political participation within Burma Proper, the Frontier 
Areas were further removed from the potential impact that the Burman majority might have 
through participation in government. The British saw it necessary, to establish a Shan 
States Federation in order to protect the Sawbwas, both fiscally and politically, from the 
effects of a more democratic government and of Burman nationalism.”58  The Kachin Hills 
Regulation of 1895, the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896, and the 1919 Act of Federated Shan 
States are all results of this effort, and all ensured continued autonomy, not from British 
rule, but from the central colonial state that was forming in Burma Proper.59  In this way, 
the government relationships of the Frontier Areas further diverged from that of the center. 
Burma Proper practiced discriminatory and partial representative government, at the same 
time that the Frontier Areas continued to enjoy autonomy.60  
Martin Smith emphasizes that whatever division already existed between the 
people of the plains and hills in Burma was exacerbated by British colonial policy, 
further separating the center Ministerial Area of Burma Proper from the Frontier Areas. 
Judicial structures evolved quickly in the center, rapidly becoming an important part of 
the colonial state bureaucratic apparatus, but this was not the case in the frontier areas, 
where simplified British law was encouraged, but the responsibility still remained at the 
traditional authorities’ discretion.61  All told, British colonialism introduced little change 
for the peripheral minorities. The benefactor was different, but the cultural and 
administrative autonomy remained. 
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2. Ethnic Relationships in Burma Proper 
British colonialism clearly had a larger impact that simply institutionalizing the 
historical autonomy of peripheral Burma. It greatly changed the relationships between the 
ethnicities themselves, especially within Burma Proper. The Burman center no longer 
held sway over its neighbors, and in contrast, while many ethnicities on the frontier were 
allowed to largely govern themselves, the Burman populated core ceded its power to the 
British and the Indians imported by the British to help administrate the territory. Initially, 
with the Burman authority displaced, lawlessness abounded, and martial law was the 
prescribed and necessary solution. The British used as many as 40,500 Indian and British 
troops, to enforce and police the territories. In an effort to relieve their own troops and 
reduce the financial debt between colonial India and its Burmese appendage, the 
ethnicities of Burma were ultimately used to constrain each other, in the “classic example 
of British divide et impera (divide and rule).”62  Put simply, following WWI, the British 
began to use the ethnic minorities to subjugate and rule the Burman dominated center.   
The numbers illustrate the disproportionality of the participation: “13 percent of the 
population accounted for 83 percent of the indigenous portion of the armed forces in 
Burma in 1931.”63   
Crosthwaite explained the ethnic disparity in the Burmese security forces as a 
decision based on entirely on performance, citing the American Baptist converted Karen, 
which populated the eastern edge of Burma Proper, as the most loyal and the most 
dependable. Similarly, the northernmost of the frontier area minorities, the Kachin, were 
described as, “probably the strongest race we have in Burma,” and therefore deserving of 
use in the military.64  Crosthwaite’s memoirs actually acknowledged that the lack of 
Burman inclusion was “a blot on our escutcheon,”65 but whatever initial desire existed 
include the Burmans ultimately disappeared due to concerns about constancy to the 
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British crown. Instead, the ethnicities of the frontier and the aforementioned Karen were 
coopted into the security forces, and those forces were used to maintain and enforce 
British order throughout the territory. The Burmans, which had dominated much of 
Burma for hundreds of years prior, found the traditional power dynamic overturned, now 
increasingly policed by populations that used to pay tribute.66 
3. Modern Institutions and Political Participation in Burma Proper 
Political participation was introduced by the British in Burma Proper as a result of 
Burmese boycotts in 1920. Burmese laborers were protesting the fact that political 
participation that had been granted to India, but not to its perceived politically immature 
appendage. The British had neglected to introduce any form of representative rule due to 
what they had perceived as a commensurate lack of interest and political maturity within 
Burma. The contrasting policies, however, activated and politicized Burmese groups, 
including the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA).67  The boycott and student 
protest compelled the British to extend diarchy to Burma as well, providing a Legislative 
Council as the first opportunity for national Burmese participation. This consequently 
caused the creation and growth of political parties and political contest for influence, 
including bitter contestations over ethnic representation. Mon representation was 
successfully opposed by the Burmans but the British reserved participation for the Karen 
and Indian nationals. Despite the struggle for influence, the best Burman politicians could 
hope for was forty-nine of eighty elected seats in a 103 seat Legislative Council that was, 
generally powerless in comparison to the British Governor.68 
Economic growth fueled political participation, but a disconnection existed 
between the politicians, largely populated by the burgeoning middle-class, and the 
peasantry. While the newborn middle class sought to maintain its status and standard of 
living, and therefore both endorsed and accepted the modern state apparatus, the 
peasantry instead lived in avoidance of, and desired the removal of the state’s taxation 
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and oppression. Taylor describes the development of political parties and political 
representation but concludes that full development was never reached. Burmese political 
parties never fully connected with the peasantry, and the state apparatus never fully 
achieved legitimacy. More to the point, it remained a symbol of colonial rule; it was 
never considered Burmese.69 
It was in this setting that the British government, motivated by increasing 
nationalist and political aspirations in India, decided to reorganize and codify India’s 
governance to include indigenous representation, albeit under dominant executive 
oversight of the British governor. The Government of India Act, 1935 was ultimately 
split, giving birth to the Government of Burma Act, 1935. The act delineated the 
administrative government of Burma to the extent that it is often referred to as a 
constitution, and “was a significant document in the development of the modern state in 
Burma.”70  The act established the legitimacy of democratic institutions, such as British-
style government structures, as well as parties and popular participation. In terms of the 
ethnic dilemma in Burma, these institutions had several notable qualities. Most 
importantly, this new “Government of Burma,” specifically the Legislature, had no 
jurisdiction over the Frontier Areas, specifically the Shan States, the Arakan Hill Tracts, 
the Chin Hills District, and the Kachin Hill Tracts.71  These areas continued to be directly 
administered by the Governor, and were not invited into the Burmese government, nor 
expected to yield any authority to it. 
The Burma Act succeeded in establishing a parliamentary institution under the 
pre-colonial concept of the Hluttaw, meaning a council of ministers, but it never 
succeeded in creating a legitimate and responsive representative government, largely due 
to “the contradictions between the British veto and national self-government,”72 Instead, 
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the Act’s effective significance transcended its purpose, as it would later become the 
blueprint for independent Burma’s first constitution.73  Because it was the first 
installation of liberal and modern government, the Act set a precedence in structure and 
style that would not be greatly diverged from in future designs.   
As a result of the British introduced modern and democratic political institutions, 
Burman politicians were introduced to the foundations that would be necessary for the 
execution of liberal government, and thus, as the constitutional future of an independent 
Burma.  Importantly, this model contained reserved positions and participation quotas 
within government for the ethnic minorities within Burma Proper.74   
D. WWII: The Japanese center and the Amorphous Periphery 
Japan’s invasion, occupation, and ultimate defeat were just as impactful in Burma 
as it was throughout the rest of Southeast Asia. Both the retreating British and the 
retreating Japanese executed a scorched earth policy, leaving Burma’s infrastructure and 
economy in ruin. Politically, the Burman were given the capacity to exercise their 
growing nationalist movement, while the minorities empowered within Burma proper by 
the British, found themselves dangerously without the security of the colonial state. 
Despite these great changes, the separation of core and periphery remained. Japanese 
occupation and administration focused on the resource rich center and never extended to 
the British Frontier Areas, leaving them still largely autonomous. Guerrillas made up of 
the Kachin, Chin, and Arakanese would be trained by British and American personnel, 
which encouraged ethnic nationalism as a way to encourage Japanese opposition. As this 
section will prove, the historical precedence of a strong central state with regional ethnic 
autonomy that had been institutionalized by the British was not destroyed by Japanese 
occupation. Instead, even as both majority and minority were militarily trained and 
armed, it was reemphasized 
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The ethnic power dynamic was once again inverted with the coming of WWII. 
Ethnic Burmans, specifically members of Do Bama Asiayone,75 a student based Burman 
political organization that had been born in the early days of diarchy, and their leaders, 
called Thakins, found potential power and influence in the coming invasion of the 
Japanese. Through collaboration with the Japanese, several Thakins, including U Nu and 
the father of modern Burma, Aung San, negotiated and coordinated military training and 
armament through the Japanese, which essentially armed an already organized Burman 
organization. Together, they helped the Japanese invasion and threw off British rule. 
These young Burmans were organized and trained by the Japanese as the Burma 
Independence Army (BIA), and the Burmans took the opportunity with enthusiasm, 
swelling in numbers and comprising the bulk of the force.76  The European defeat at the 
hands of an Asian power had ignited nationalism across Southeast Asia, but perhaps no 
population was more eager to take advantage of the situation like the Burmans. The 
organization was ethnically and nationalistically Burman. It rarely ventured out of the 
Burman center, and excluded minorities from its ranks.77   
Nationalism mobilized and impassioned the BIA, but independence efforts were 
prevented by Japanese occupation, and the now armed Burman frustration was instead 
focused on righting past wrongs and avenging previous oppression.78  The BIA was 
employed as an administrative arm and internal police force for the Japanese, flipping the 
ethnic power relationship that had previously been turned on its head by the British, and 
reestablishing Burman dominance. Removed from direct Japanese influence simply due 
to the insufficient oversight the Japanese could provide, nationalism fermented unabated 
and lawless was a byproduct. Acts such as robbery and murder were justified by vigilante 
logic. They were correcting and reallocating the wealth that had been unfairly extracted 
by the colonial state.79 
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Unfortunately for the minorities of Burma, BIA retribution not only sought to 
right the wrongs, but to punish those responsible. With the British absent, the focus 
naturally fell to those that had cooperated with and enabled the colonial state. Thus, 
Burman vengeance had an ethnic side. As an answer to the years of oppression 
subjugation at the hands of the British enabled minorities, the BIA specifically targeted 
minorities, especially Karen for revenge. Seventeen Karen elders were murdered by 
armed Burmans, and upon intercepting a Karen note planning revenge, Burman attacks 
on the Karen multiplied.  “BIA units executed Karen men, women, and children and 
arrested whole villages simply for being Karen,”80  Four hundred villages were 
destroyed, and nearly two thousand Karen were indiscriminately killed, despite the fact 
that Aung San, serving as the military commander forbade it. This indiscriminate 
vengeful act enacted by the BIA could well be considered the birthplace of modern 
Burmese ethnic conflict.81 
The lawlessness led to Japanese attempts to discipline its young Burman deputies, 
which ultimately the estranged the relationship and resulted in violent armed clashes. At 
this, the Japanese reconsidered wide usage of the young Burman nationals, and instead 
attempted to turn back to the minority administrative elites the British had used some 
fifty years prior. The BIA was disbanded in August of 1943, with only five of the twenty 
three thousand Burmese in the BIA retained to form the more professional and tightly 
organized Burma National Army (BNA).82 The Japanese assumed they would create a 
more controllable entity, but the act encouraged the BNA to seek its support rather than 
foreign endorsement, which had already proven unreliable. The BNA did turn out to be a 
more effective organization, and it used those qualities to connect with the Burman 
populace and become a political actor. The overall effect was disastrous for the Japan, as 
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At first glance, the anti-Japanese movement seems to offer the perfect prescription 
for Burmese unity. Core and periphery alike shared the common enemy, and indeed 
loosely cooperated toward Japanese expulsion, but beneath this common primary goal, 
independent visions of autonomy and political power existed that were anything but 
unified. The anti-Japanese movement in the core may have had the potential for 
unification, but the quick defeat of the Japanese eliminated the cause before any 
institutional or procedural cooperation could be created, and bloodshed between the 
Karen and Burman during the Japanese occupation remained fundamental to the 
relationship, preventing cooperation.84   
The Frontier remained excluded from the administrative and political power 
contest introduced by Japanese occupation. Japanese, never fully extended to these 
regions during the war, creating yet another divergent experience between the core and 
the periphery that had been institutionalized in both pre-colonial and British colonial 
history. The frontier areas were instead recruited and trained into irregular units of 
resistance by the British and Americans, encouraging armed guerilla resistance to foreign 
occupation. Smith describes the dichotomy: “With the British continuing to recruit ethnic 
Kachin, Karen and Chin battalions while the Japanese-trained BNA remained 
predominantly Burman, the war had been fought along largely racial lines.”85 
E. Breaking the British Bonds: Burmese Nationalism and Politics 
The Japanese granted Burma its independence on January 28, 1943, and an 
Independence Preparatory Commission was established for the creation of a “simple but 
effective,” constitution, but the Japanese continued occupation granted little sovereignty 
within the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.86  Instead, the idea of Burmese 
independence ruminated, and with the quick collapse of the Japanese, ultimately found 
itself back in the familiar hands of the British in the regional military administration of 
the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). Now, however, the disorganized political scene 
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that was forming before WWII was replaced by a similarly chaotic setting now 
complicated with military armaments, military political ambition, and national notoriety 
for the likes of Aung San and U Nu. London saw the BIA and its leadership as Japanese 
collaborators, and therefore branded them traitors more deserving of punishment than of 
inclusion and influence in post WWII Burmese politics.87  Aung San and his fellow 
thakins recast their organization as the more inclusive Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) 
and then the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) and made a concerted 
effort to attack the retreating Japanese in an attempt to win British support. They found it 
in Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the SEAC commander, and Sir Reginald Dorman-
Smith, the returning Governor, who proved lenient, focusing on promoting inclusive 
conditions for an independent Burma, rather than prosecuting traitors.88  As a result, 
Mountbatten pardoned those implicated, and ensured their inclusion in the process of 
setting up the new Burmese government, while Sir Reginald worked to enact the steps of 
the White Paper for “full-self-government”89 
Smith describes early Burmese politics as especially unique in that the dominant 
political groups were left-leaning, yet faced their most significant challenge from more 
radical socialist elements. The student based Do Bama Asiayone, which beget the AFO 
and the AFPFL, espoused Marxist ideals. The books and articles, written by its 
burgeoning leadership that included the likes of the future Burmese icons U Nu and Aung 
San, were rife with communist reference, but in contrast to many other nationalist 
struggles in the region, they were included as a means not an end.  “Most of the 
[leadership] saw Marxism as a mere instrument in their anti-colonial struggle.”90  The 
strategy and goals published by the organization professed a desire for civil liberties and 
democratic rights, rather than class equality. The focus of the organization was on the 
independence struggle, not class warfare.91 
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Because of Do Bama Asiayone’s loose commitment to communist principles, 
ideological space remained for more radical communist proponents, and it is from this 
position, not from ethnic minorities, that the organization and the early governments it 
dominated initially experienced domestic threats. The focus and struggle of Burma’s 
nascent political leadership in the AFO/AFPFL would be the marginalization of the 
various socialist splinter organizations, namely the White Flag and Red Flag 
Communists, albeit by inclusion, out maneuvering their leadership for popular support, or 
outright warfare. Surprisingly, ethnic participation proved more promising, as Aung San 
and the League would succeed in securing nominal allegiance of from the Shan and even 
the Karen, despite a period of conflict and bloodshed between the two ethnic groups.92 
Aung San’s notoriety, prominence, and political clout through the AFPFL enabled 
him to demand more than inclusion in a British plan for Burmese independence; it 
allowed him to manipulate the terms. By threatening AFPLF rebellion, and continuing to 
outmaneuver his internal AFPFL rivals, he was rewarded by being chosen to travel to 
London in January of 1947 as one of six official Burmese representatives. There he 
pressed for “full independence within one year… and the early unification of the Frontier 
Areas with the Government of Burma.”93 In the Attlee-Aung San agreement signed later 
that month, Aung San got nearly every term he pursued, including the unification of the 
Frontier Areas, which the British only agreed to with the caveat that the ethnicities 
themselves participate voluntarily. Burma would be an independent, unified country in, 
as Aung San had promised, less than a year.94 
F. Conclusion 
By January of 1947, Burma’s leadership faced many crucial decisions. 
Independence was rapidly materializing, and while many, including Aung San’s AFPFL 
and the British government desired a unified Burma, the division that existed between the 
center and the periphery demanded careful negotiation and development. As this chapter 
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has emphasized, the minorities of the periphery had enjoyed autonomy regardless of 
Pagan, Konbaung, Toungoo, British, and Japanese central control. There was little reason 
for them to expect or settle for anything less under an independent Burmese government. 
The minorities within Burma’s center, namely the Karen, were void of that experience 
and understandably less optimistic of their prospects under Burman rule. The Burman 
majority on the other hand, were now empowered to reestablish themselves as the strong 
central state, and given a template for modern democratic government by which to 
establish it. These historical experiences stimulated the desires of peripheral autonomy 
and a unified representative democracy that shaped the decisions of 1947. Federalism 
was one of many possible forms of government, it was the only one that seemed to 
answer both of these historically emphasized preferences. 
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III. CHOICE, CONSTITUTION, AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE 
FIRST BURMESE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD 
A. Introduction 
Burma’s political leadership faced serious political choices in 1947. For the 
sawbwas, chiefs, and leaders of Burma’s minorities, the dilemma hinged upon gradations 
of autonomy, weighing participation and cooperation with the Burman majority against 
the desire for sovereignty and self-determination. Some, like the Karen, wished to 
continue their previous relationship with the British, while others were more willing 
participants in the formation of a Burmese Union.95  For the Burman majority, the 
primary goal was the unification of the country and the inclusion of all Burmese people 
under one government. This chapter will examine the decisions these groups made, their 
ethnic implications, and their ultimate failure.  These institutional choices, represented by 
the 1947 Constitution, will be analyzed using Stepan’s federalist model to appraise their 
potential for accommodating Burma’s minorities, and possibly expose the flaws that 
prevented ethnic peace in a united Burma.   
This chapter consists of five sections.  First, the negotiations and agreement at 
Panglong will be recounted, revealing the desires and intentions of several of Burma’s 
ethnicities prior to independence.  Following that, the Government Act of 1935, which 
was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter will be revealed as the blueprint for 
Burma’s Constitution.  Third, Burma’s 1947 Constitution will be reviewed with 
particular emphasis on federal and ethnic implications.  That constitution will then be 
tested against Stepan’s ethnofederal criteria and variables to ascertain its theoretical 
potential.  Finally, the final section will describe the subsequent breakdown of democracy 
that led to ethnic insurgency and the governmental takeover by Burma’s military. 
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B. Panglong and Ethnic Negotiations 
Negotiations and resolutions started before the Constituent Assembly came 
together in to discuss Burma’s future in 1947.  The willing inclusion of Burma’s 
peripheral minorities was a common goal of the British, Aung San’s AFPFL, and the 
minorities themselves.  The first significant case of negotiations between the AFPFL and 
minority leadership happened in the Shan village of Panglong in February of 1947. The 
agreement signed there was instrumental in the inclusion of the Shan, Kachin, and Chin 
minorities. It established a standard by which minorities would judge autonomy and 
territorial accommodation both then, and even now.  “The spirit of Panglong,” would come 
to represent an altruistic sense of compromise and trust that was and still is necessary to unify 
Burma.  More specifically, however, it represented then, just as it does now, a commitment to 
territorial accommodation and autonomy for Burma’s ethnic minorities.  This section 
chronicles those negotiations, the decisions made, and the impact they had upon the 
governance choices made at the subsequent Constituent Assembly. 
Up to this point the political experiences of the periphery differed drastically from 
those of the core.  Even Japanese plans for an independent Burma had excluded the Shan and 
Karenni.96  This historical separation did not pass unnoticed by British governance and was 
the basis for a requiring unification only “with the free consent of the inhabitants of those 
[Frontier and Ministerial] areas.”97  This mandate forced Aung San and the AFPFL to court 
the periphery for inclusion.  The British, for their part, attempted to lay the groundwork for 
cooperation and unity by convening a meeting between Shan, Chin, Kachin and Karen 
leadership in the Shan village of Panglong in March of 1946.98  There, the British proposed 
the idea of a United Frontier Union, and attempted to assuage the prospective minorities’ 
fears.  Voluntary participation was echoed by Aung San, still seeking British sponsorship, 
who stated, “As for the people of the Frontier Areas, they must decide their own future. If 
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they wish to come in with us we will welcome them on equal terms.”99  The culmination of 
these sentiments and of British efforts would be the second meeting at Panglong in 1947, 
with the Shan, Kachin, Chin, and Aung San of the AFPFL. 
At the second and more famous meeting in Panglong, Aung San made several 
commitments to the ethnic representatives, “including internal autonomy, the desire for a 
Kachin State, [similar to that of the Shan State provided for by the Burma Act of 1935] 
and the right to secession.”100  The final agreement, signed on February 12, 1947, 
guaranteed executive input and inclusion in the form of a Counselor “selected by the 
Governor on the recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the 
United Hill Peoples…to deal with the Frontier Areas.”  This Chancellor would have 
executive authority for the region, and represent the territory on the Executive Council of 
Burma. It further established the “separate Kachin State,” affirmed the Shan State, 
established revenue sharing for the Frontier Areas from the future central government, 
and guaranteed Frontier Area citizens of “the rights and privileges which are regarded as 
fundamental in democratic countries.”101 
The commitment made at Panglong has resonated and repeated throughout the 
minorities’ political demands ever since. A return to “the spirit of Panglong” is a 
common phrase uttered by the ethnic groups and politicians in Burma and it is echoed in 
political commentary and academic writings focused on federalism in Burma.102  This 
does not imply, however, that Panglong was without flaw. The representatives the ethnic 
minorities at the meeting were selected by the British from among those who had 
previously cooperated with the colonial organization, not by the people themselves. 
Participation was also notably limited, excluding the Karenni, Mon, Arakanese. The 
Karen showed up, but acted as only an observer, continuing to rely on direct negotiations 
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with the British for a Karen State. The Chin, meanwhile, negotiated cautiously with Aung 
San and the Burman representation, troubled and inhibited by their reliance on the 
center’s food supply.103   
Incomplete participation and ethnic inequality notwithstanding, the meeting and 
the document held great significance for the future of a unified Burma. The Kachin elders 
loudly voiced their skepticism, but also noted that despite their misgiving originating 
from the past, cooperation and “close relations” were possible as long as “hereditary 
rights, customs and religions” were adequately protected.104 The commitment toward 
“full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas,”105 would ultimately 
come to be the very definition of the “spirit of Panglong,” and Panglong itself would 
come to represent the larger notion of unity, as it is still celebrated as “Burma’s Union 
Day.”106  The principle of regional ethnic autonomy within a union was accepted by both 
sides as the blueprint for a Burmese constitution.107  The concept of federalism may have 
been first introduced with the British creation of the Shan Federated States in the early 
1920s and reinforced in the Government of Burma Act, 1935, but it was at Panglong 
that the idea of multiple ethnic autonomous regions within a united Burma had its 
beginning. At this meeting in Panglong, the foundations of Burmese ethnofederalism 
were established. 
C. Reviewing the Blueprint:  The Government of Burma Act, 1935 
The agreement signed at Panglong was not the only document that would 
influence and guide those writing the constitution. The British Government of Burma Act, 
1935 had introduced modern political structures including representative government to 
Burma Proper.  By establishing diarchy, the Burmese people in the center were able to 
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exercise a small degree of self-governance, while the governor held ultimate power.  
Because it served as the first practical exercise of modern governance, it was, Taylor 
describes, “a significant document in the development of the modern state in Burma,”108 
acting as an initial blueprint for the “electoral machinery”109 and governmental structures 
of the constitution for independent Burma.  Because of this, it is worth highlighting a few 
articles in the  British document for the precedent it set, and is the focus of this section. 
The most obvious characteristic of the Act is also most understandable given the 
source and the context: disproportionate power to the executive. It is hardly surprising 
that the British, while interested in providing an outlet for Burmese political unrest and 
willing to coopt these elements into a form of representative government, retained the 
overall authority and sovereignty for themselves.  Charged with, among other duties, 
“safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities,”110 the Governor of Burma, 
appointed by the British crown, held a dominant position over the local Legislature 
and Burma. The Governor had the authority to eliminate or prevent bills and legislation, 
based on his judgment alone.111 He was also given the freedom and responsibility 
to exercise individual judgment in policymaking without legislative approval,112 
unchallengeable final authority,113 appointment authority over the financial and judicial 
heads of state,114 and the ultimate power to dissolve legislature and assume those powers, 
as well.115 
Another way in which the Act strengthened the Governor’s position and dominant 
positional authority in comparison to the local representative assembly was by putting 
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him in command of the military.  Military control, defined as “the raising in Burma on 
behalf of His Majesty of naval, military and air forces, and to the governance of His 
Majesty’s forces borne on the Burma establishment,”116 was given to the Governor. This 
authority had two significant consequences. First, it allowed the British to continue to 
exercise prejudicial selection in the composition of its Burmese forces, therefore 
facilitating the overwhelming use of minorities that was previously illustrated. Second, it 
established a fixed and direct relationship between those forces and the Governor. The 
executive of Burma had complete control of the military. This feature was actually 
reinforced thanks in part to the Japanese occupation. Taylor points out that the 
constitution written for independence from the Japanese in 1943 had several features 
taken from Burma’s occupiers, most notably in the robust executive powers that included 
unreserved military control, which served to encourage military participation in 
government and give military leaders political influence.117 
The government structures prescribed by the Act influenced the Burmese 
Constitution as well.  The British solution was bicameral, with a thirty-six seat Senate 
and a one hundred and thirty-two seat House of Representatives, that retained many of 
the qualities exhibited in liberal representative assemblies.118  It was not the rules that 
made the Legislature a significant precedent, but its composition, as the Third Schedule 
of the Act designated specific ethnic and occupational seats within the government. The 
Karen community (similar to the Indian and European populations) was given twelve 
designated seats119 and proportional representation in the Senate.120  Seats vacated by 
Karens could only be filled by Karens,121 and territorial constituencies were established 
for the election of these officials.122  The Karen, through the Government of Burma Act, 
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were legally guaranteed of inclusion and influence within the government.  The Burmans, 
in contrast, had no reserved representation and had to compete for the ninety-one non-
communal seats.  Reserved ethnic representation is a characteristic that would greatly 
influence the coming constitution, and was first introduced in the British Act. 
Finally, while the Shan State was listed under the Second Schedule, thereby 
giving it autonomy from the Legislature, it also received a separate section within part 
VI, Finance. The specific funds and terms reserved for the Shan States are less significant 
than the additional separation and autonomy they represented. Even as the Act 
specifically limited legislative side of government to Burma Proper, it also explicitly 
provided for the continuance of the tributary financial relationship, and further 
legitimized and reassured the Shan Sawbwas of their continued authority.  It was 
constitutionally based territorial autonomy, another important precedent influencing 
Burma’s Constituent Assembly. 
D. The Constitution: Construction, Institutions, and Relationships 
In April of 1947, elections were held for a Constituent Assembly to draft the 
Burmese Constitution. The AFPFL actively campaigned and sought to eliminate rival 
representation in the Constituent Assembly, and thanks in part to Aung San’s efforts, 
limited Communist participation to only seven of the 255 seats. The AFPFL did not 
attempt to restrict ethnic involvement and that assembly impressively included Shan, 
Kachin, Chin, Karenni, and Karen representation.123  Their participation however, should 
not and did not indicate that they were without fear or reservation. As a leader of the 
Karen Central Organization (KCO) described the fears of Burman majority: “The last 
three and a half years have shown us what can and most inevitably will happen to a small 
race or nation in the absence of a protecting power.”124 
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With the assassination of Aung San, the AFPFL guarantor at Panglong, 
pessimism amongst the minorities was certainly warranted.125  The participation of 
Burma’s minorities in the Assembly was largely successful.  A Shan chief was elected as 
the second president of the Assembly, and only the Karen and Arakanese displayed 
hesitation to joining in the Union.  The Karens, having sat on the sidelines at Panglong, 
continued to petition the British for support in an independent state. Bilateral negotiations 
between the AFPFL and the Karen proved less fruitful than Panglong had been for the 
Chin, Kachin, and Shan, and it was only with participation in the Constituent Assembly 
that any special representative provisions were considered.126  The ethnically and 
religiously divided Arakanese territories had fallen into chaos, with “no less than three 
different groups of separatists,” one Muslim, one Buddhist, and one riding the coattails of 
the Communist Party.127  Despite these hesitations, the Constituent Assembly successfully 
garnered the participation of Burma’s minorities with the intent and willingness to join 
together as the Union of Burma.  This section analyses their choices, represented by the 
Constitution of 1947.  Constitutional chapters and articles with ethnic or federal 
implications will be highlighted to facilitate further analysis later in the chapter. 
1. We the People: The Preamble  
The Constituent Assembly had a difficult task, attempting bring all of Burma 
together under a single government, something that had never previously been 
accomplished, while discontent and active rebellion already existed among the Karen and 
Arakanese.  The Preamble itself highlights the historical division in the country as it 
begins, “We, the People of Burma including the Frontier Areas and the Karenni 
States.”128  That the phrase “the People of Burma,” did not resonate and encompass all of 
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parties contributing to the drafting and ratification of a unionizing constitution speaks to 
the fragility of the national movement behind the constitution. 
2. State Formation  
In chapter 1 titled, “The Form of State,” the effects of the Panglong Agreement 
and the minorities’ desire for autonomy were clearly present. The Shan State, Karenni 
State, and Kachin State were established, notably before Union government structures 
were explained, or any citizen rights were delineated.  Clearly the autonomy of the ethnic 
states was of great significance, and deserving of their prominence at the front of the 
document.  The autonomous states and regions were introduced in this section, but the 
function and institutional relationships between these territories and their constituencies 
were later defined and explained in Chapter IX.   In a similar fashion, but unmentioned in 
Chapter 1, the Chin were given a Special Division which had a similarly constructed state 
council and centrally appointed minister, but they were not given statehood, nor the 
commensurate guaranteed authorities listed in the “State Legislative List.”129   
Notably absent from the list of ethnic groups with their own autonomous territory 
were the Arakan, and the Karen. The Arakan were a heterogeneous community already 
showing signs of internal fracture, but the Karen in particular presented a unique and 
significant problem. The vast majority of ethnic minorities in Burma were concentrated 
in peripheral regions and separate territories, but the Karen were a large population 
scattered and mixed among the Burman majority. Because of this geographical condition, 
the lack of participation at Panglong, their continued pursuit of British sponsorship for an 
ethnic homeland, and the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by leading Karen political 
entity, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karen were not initially granted a state in 
the 1947 Constitution.130  Instead, “The Karens were given ‘minority rights’…entitled to 
special rights in employment, representation in Parliament, etc.,”131 which included a 
Karen Council, mirroring those established for the Shan, Karenni, Kachin, and Chin. The 
continued agitation and conflict with the Karen eventually brought additional concessions 
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by the government. Ultimately these included the establishment of a Karen State in a 
1951 Constitution Amendment Act, and the elimination of the clauses and concessions 
that treated them differently from their fellow minorities.132 
While states and autonomy were desired and apparently necessary for the 
inclusion of Burma’s minorities, there was no model or definition that initially guided the 
Assembly in its construction of the instructions and their relationships. After much 
negotiation and dialogue, Scotland’s relationship with the United Kingdom surfaced as 
the preferred model. This example became the inspiration behind the Ethnic Councils’ 
dual function as state lawmakers and union representatives. According to Maung, this 
placated the assembly’s concern about the size of government, which had to be limited in 
scope due to both personnel and financial constraints of the new country. Similarly, the 
separate state institutions and government organs that were originally intended were 
eschewed in favor of the singular parliament, judiciary, and executive institutions of the 
Union government.133 
The three original states, the Karen State, and the Chin Special Division were 
given administrative control over the civil service, schools, and cultural institutions 
within their territories. Two states, the Shan and the Karenni, were even granted the right 
to secede after ten years. All of the minorities’ representatives to the Chamber of 
Nationalities formed distinct ethnic Councils which could pass legislation for their own 
populations and territory with the signature of the president. The executive head of each 
state, a minister, would be appointed from this group by the president, not the 
constituents of the state.134  Through these relationships with the Union Executive, the 
president of Burma was positioned to play a large role in the governance of the 
autonomous regions, while the council and minister served both the central government, 
and their states.135   
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3. Fundamental Rights: Inclusive of Burma’s Minorities 
Burma’s minorities were not restricted from the civil, religious, cultural, 
educational and economic rights that follow the Form of State, under the heading of 
“Fundamental Rights.”  These rights are conferred without exclusions or limitations to all 
of “Burma’s citizens,” which is further ambiguously defined as any person with direct 
lineage or connection to Burma’s “indigenous races.”  Despite the ambiguity of that 
phrase, the extents of the fundamental rights and liberties are extensive.  Discrimination 
on the basis of language, race, and religion are prohibited, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Hinduism, and Animism are all recognized religions, and freedoms such as assembly, 
expression, and association are guaranteed.  The rights and liberties are even more 
extraordinary given the time and setting, but it is worth noting that these civil liberties 
were eligible for suspension in “times of war, invasion, rebellion, insurrection or grave 
emergency.”136  This emergency clause had a similar justification for the emergency 
powers given to the British Governor in the Government of Burma Act, and left the door 
open for both protecting the public, and limiting its ability to protest or revolt. 
4. Burma’s Legislature:  Ethnic Representation in the Chambers 
The Legislature followed the example set forth by the Government of Burma Act, 
1935, in that it specifically allocated seats within the Parliament for ethnic minorities. 
The Chamber of Nationalities was designed to accomplish this very purpose, and 
allocated enough seats to the ethnic minorities of Burma so that “minority peoples 
collectively command a majority over the Burmans.”137  Of the one hundred and twenty-
five seat assembly, twenty-five were allocated to the Shan, twelve to the Kachin, eight to 
the Chin, three to the Karenni, and twenty four to the Karen. These ratios left fifty-three 
unclaimed seats, and guaranteed that in the least, minorities would command fifty-seven 
percent of the Chamber. The Amendment Act of 1951, written and ratified to establish 
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the Karen State, reduced the Karen allotment to only fifteen and increased the unreserved 
seat count to sixty-two, which was just under half of the Chamber.138 
The Chamber of Deputies was a popular representative chamber, with one 
representative for each thirty to one hundred thousand people, and did not delineate any 
specific representation beyond the constituency from which it was elected. There was 
originally one exception to this in that the Karen, regardless of constituency origins, were 
guaranteed a representation proportionate with their population. This concession was 
eliminated in 1951 with the creation of the Karen State, meaning that the Chamber of 
Deputies was afterward thoroughly comprised of popularly elected officials without 
ethnic or regional criteria.139  Subsequently, the Chamber of Deputies was destined to 
become a Burman dominated assembly in accordance with their large population. In the 
event of hung legislation, a bill that had passed in one chamber and not the other, a joint 
session called by the president would decide the matter by majority.140 
5. Burma’s President:  Individual Power within the Executive 
The office of the presidency was established as Burma’s executive in Chapter V 
of the constitution. The president was to be chosen from a joint vote of Parliament rather 
than popular vote from the people. His authority once again included numerous 
appointments that included the prime minister, the heads of the Shan, Kachin, and Karenni 
States, and the rest of the “Union Government.”141  Maung Maung’s Burma’s Constitution 
is decidedly optimistic in the analysis and explanation of the document. In it, he describes 
the office to be “severely limited”142 in power, as the bulk of his functions were to be 
executed with advice and counsel from the rest of government, and the president did not 
have veto power over passed legislation. Taylor agrees, stating that it was a, “nominal 
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president possessing few effective veto powers. There were, however, no explicit checks 
placed upon the president either, meaning that there was no real impetus to make decisions 
in opposition to his advisors, or in accordance with party or ethnic cleavages. Even Maung 
admits that several of the powers given to the office are “reminiscent of the powers of the 
Governor under the Government of Burma Act of 1935.”143 
6. Burma’s Judicial Branch:  No Minority Allocation 
In contrast to the legislature, no positions in the national judiciary were reserved 
for minorities. As a commitment to the Union, traditional ethnic rulers such as the Shan 
Sawbwas, had to surrender their inherent judicial powers, and instead, the secular courts 
of the states established the extents to which ethnic specific justice could be sought and 
executed.144  The justices of the Supreme Court, including the chief justice, were 
permanently appointed by the president and approved by parliament in an attempt to 
place them above political influence.145  Because of their nomination by the president, 
the Supreme Court was likely to be overwhelmingly populated by Burman justices if it 
was not ethnically Burman in its entirety.  The only control the minorities had upon the 
composition of the Supreme Court was through the approval process of the president’s 
appointments in the Chamber of Nationalities.  Only in that chamber would minorities 
have enough combined influence to oppose or curtail majority Burman appointments. 
7. Delineating Power: Legislative Lists and Minority Policymaking 
Authority 
Legislative lists were explicitly laid out to distinguish those policy decisions 
which were reserved for the states, from those reserved for the central government. The 
“Union Legislative List” which included the expected authority to raise, train, and equip 
the military, also included the expected dominion over international relations, finance, 
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and citizenship provision.146  The “State Legislative List,” in contrast, had an 
understandably narrower focus on local taxes, education, and health. Security legislation 
for the states was limited to public order, through village police, and the administration of 
justice through local courts subordinate to the high courts of the Union.   The final word 
in the separation of powers is listed in the 40th subsection of the “Union Legislative 
List,” that confers “any other matter not enumerated in List II [State Legislative List]”147 
into the hands of the Union. Any matter that the states were not constitutionally assured 
of influencing relinquished to the central government. 
E. Analyzing the Constitution: Federalism or Empty Autonomy? 
The Constituent Assembly’s directive resolution, proposed by Aung San himself 
seems to contain contemporary definition of federalism: “The constitution shall specify 
constituent units of the Union of Burma and define their powers of autonomy.”148 The 
term federal is noticeably absent in both this directive resolution and the constitution 
itself.  Even the previously named “Federated Shan States” were recast to become the 
Shan State within the government. Yet despite the semantic omission, scholars agree that 
federalism was the blueprint, and to those assembled, the motivation that inspired their 
participation.149  With the addition of the Karen State, the majority of Burma’s 
minorities, including the Shan, Karen, Kachin, Karenni, and Chin, were constitutionally 
prescribed to retain a great deal of autonomy within designated states. Culture, religion, 
language, and schools, the flashpoints of many nationalistic grievances, were reserved for 
ethnic governance. The relationship, Taylor asserts, was distinctly federal.150  This 
section will compare the 1947 Constitution to contemporary definitions of 
ethnofederalism. The second and third subsections will evaluate the constitution against 
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Stepan’s specific criteria and variables to ascertain their strengths or weaknesses in 
accommodating Burma’s minorities and their demands. 
1. Superficial Evaluations:  Not Quite Ethnofederalism 
While the construction and intent may have been federal, the effect was not as 
certain.  Taylor’s analysis of the constitution is that it “delineated the federal state, but in 
reality provided for a centralized government system. The states, eventually numbering in 
five, had no substantial legislative powers and little say in taxation or state finance.”151 
Silverstein agreed, stating, “The constitution manifests the dominance of the Burmese 
and demonstrates their ability to establish a union in which the separate states appear to 
enjoy more autonomy than they were actually granted.”152  Furthermore, conditions in 
Burma were such that enforcing and promulgating the constitution proved problematic.  
In the years following its ratification, much of Burma failed to acknowledge or 
implement the Union’s institutions or authority, and the Union lacked the resources to 
compel adherence, leaving the Shan States and the like functioning as if there had been 
little to no change at all.153  The divergence implies a dangerous scenario in which the 
states enjoyed greater autonomy than they were constitutionally granted, with a Burman 
majority party, the AFPFL, seeking to establish and enforce the Union’s sovereignty. 
The constitution may well have been written with federal principles in mind, but 
its effectiveness as an ethnofederal answer to Burma’s unification requires deeper 
analysis.  Amoretti’s definition called for “an institutionalized division of power between 
a central government and a set of constituent governments,”154 which seems fulfilled in 
the four states and one region that were established by 1951.  His second criterion, that 
“each level of government has the power to make final decisions in some policy areas but 
cannot unilaterally modify the federal structure of the state,”155 is nominally present, but 
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the presidential signature and Supreme Court referral authority on territorial legislation 
written and passed by the state councils ostensibly puts the final authority back within the 
hands of the central government.  Union review and oversight was neither intended, nor 
specifically provided for, but the processes to facilitate imposition certainly existed. 
2. Stepan’s Criteria 
Stepan’s article, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,” contains a 
deeper analysis of federalism and its composition. Because of this it is a useful 
framework for evaluating the constitution and rationalizing the basis by which Taylor and 
Silverstein regarded the government as more central than federal. To begin with, Stepan 
asserts that only “a constitutional democracy can provide credible guarantees and the 
institutionally embedded mechanisms that help ensure that the law-making prerogatives 
of the subunits will be respected.”156  The constitutional basis and democratic foundation 
for Burma’s government cannot be disputed, but what of the democratically guaranteed 
mechanisms? 
Stepan mandates that federal systems should include two defining criteria. First, 
they should have “territorial political subunits whose electorate is exclusively drawn from 
citizens of the subunit and that have areas of legal and policy-making autonomy and 
sovereignty that are constitutionally guaranteed.”157  The territorial political subunits 
existed for the Shan, Karenni, Kachin, and Chin, as well as for the Karen after the 
amendment of 1951, but notably excluded the Arakanese and Mon.  Legal and policy-
making autonomy was established in the constitution, but as the quotes from Taylor and 
Silverstein have already stated, the scope was limited. Additionally, all unreserved 
authority defaulted to the authority of the central government, further restricting state 
autonomy and sovereignty in policy-making. 
Stepan’s second criterion is that those territorial political subunits should have a 
“state-wide political unit, which contains a legislature elected by the statewide 
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population, and which has some law and policy-making areas that are constitutionally 
guaranteed to fall within the sovereignty of the statewide body.”158  Representative 
policy-making capacity resided in the territorial Councils, which had two duties. On one 
hand, they represented their constituents in the central government as representatives in 
the Chamber of Nationalities. Concurrently, the elected representatives also constituted 
the territorial Council and lawmaking apparatus. While it could be said that this was a 
state-wide political unit with constitutionally guaranteed policy-making abilities, it 
certainly falls short of containing a distinct and separate state legislature to perform that 
role. The two defining criteria are thus met, but with significant limitations. 
3. Stepan’s Variables 
Stepan offers more concrete institutional choices that could affect a federal 
government’s demos-constraining abilities. He puts forth four variables: 
overrepresentation in the territorial chamber, policy scope of the territorial chamber, 
constitutional allocation of policy making to the subunits of the federation, and the degree 
to which the party-system is polity wide.159 
The Chamber of Nationalities is specifically designed to be the most important 
demos-constraining institution of the Union, and it fits with Stepan’s criterion for his first 
variable: the overrepresentation in the territorial chamber. The passage of laws, 
appointments, and constitutional amendments were all supposed to come under the 
judgment and approval of this parliamentary body that had over half of its seats reserved 
for minority representation. On the surface, this is just the institution Stepan suggests that 
could encourage minority participation and trust. There are, however several worrisome 
constitutional clauses affecting the influence of the Chamber of Nationalities and 
reducing its impact. First, the aforementioned hung legislation article ensures that any bill 
presented and passed by the Chamber of Deputies that is decidedly undesirable by 
Chamber of Nationalities does not meet its end with a negative vote in that chamber. 
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Instead, the matter is decided by a joint session in which a Burman majority is a real 
possibility. By joining the chambers to decide potentially ethnically divisive legislation, 
the constitution effectively facilitates a cancellation of its intended demos-constraining 
provision. 
Regarding the second variable, the policy scope of the territorial chamber, there is 
marginal but meaningful differentiation between the powers of the Chamber of 
Nationalities and the Chamber of Deputies. Both bodies had the authority to initiate 
legislation, and the vast majority of that legislation had to pass through both chambers in 
order to be promulgated as law. The one exception is in “Money bills.” Legislation 
labeled as a money bill by the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies could only be initiated 
by that legislature. The bill, once passed by the Chamber of Deputies, would be provided 
to the Chamber of Nationalities for recommendations; but the upper house’s approval 
was not required. Although its representatives had twenty-one days to evaluate the bill 
and suggest changes, it could not compel the lower house to accept its recommendations.  
The legislative body in which the minorities held greater influence was effectively shut 
out of control over any bill concerning taxes, union debt, and the appropriation of public 
money.160 
Stepan’s third variable, the degree to which policy making is constitutionally 
allocated to subunits of the federation, is further broken down into three components.161 
The first of those seeks potential legislation that requires “exceptional law-making 
majorities.” There are two such instances, and both are listed in Chapter XI pertaining to 
the amendments of the constitution.  Constitutional amendments required a two-thirds 
majority in a joint sitting of the Chambers in order to modify the constitution. In addition 
to this requirement, if any amendment affected or revised a particular state or minority’s 
rights, including the State Revenue List and State Legislative List, that amendment had to 
also include a majority of the affected minority’s representatives present.  While two-
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thirds of a joint session was not an impossible threshold for ethnic Burmans, the specific 
approval of affected minorities was a substantial protection for the constitutional rights 
and powers given them. 
The second component evaluates which powers are reserved for the center in 
comparison to the subunits.  The legislative powers of both the Union and the states are 
defined in List I and List II of the Third Schedule.  While a numerical representation 
cannot convey the potential impact of legislation, the numerical difference in assigned 
authorities is suggests inequality.  Eighty-nine areas of legislation are reserved for the 
Union, to only thirty-nine for the states.  Of those thirty-nine legislative powers, many  
ethnic sensitive issues are included, such as cultural, education, health and local judiciary 
powers.  The bulk of monetary and economic powers revert to the Union, however, 
including most taxation capabilities, and all national infrastructure.  Most significantly, 
these state powers were only conferred to those minorities which had constitutionally 
established states.  The Chin Special Division, while prescribed law-making authority for 
its territory, had no constitutional guarantee of sovereignty in those areas, while the 
Arakan and Mon had no legislative powers whatsoever.  
The third component simply asks whether, if the constitution is silent on an issue, 
the presumption is that residual law-making power resides with the center or with the 
subunits.  The last article of the Union Legislative List (List I) succinctly reserved “any 
other matter not enumerated in List II,” for the central government.162  When in doubt, 
law-making power and authority rested in the Union. In addition to these three 
components put forth by Stepan, it is important to once again draw attention to the 
concurrent territory and Union responsibilities of the councils and ministers. Clearly the 
territorial subunit policy makers had limited authority, given the above analysis, but the 
question as to whether they had a distinct policy making body at all is questionable at 
best. The final word in the breakdown of central government and subunit dominions in 
policymaking is provided in Chapter IV, article ninety-two of the constitution in which it 
states that in an emergency declared by the president, the Union Parliament has the power 
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“to make laws for a state or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in the State Legislative List.”163  In truth, there was no legislative power 
reserved for the states that the Union government could not annex if it so desired.  
Constitutional guarantees Stepan asserts are a necessary prerequisite for federalism were 
essentially undermined by this clause.164 
Stepan’s final variable shifts focus from legislative capabilities to the party 
system.  Specifically Stepan seeks to determine to what degree the party system is polity 
wide in orientation and incentives.  165This is a difficult variable to asses considering that 
the AFPFL was modeled after socialist parties, thereby infiltrating multiple levels of 
society and transcending the typical political party influence within society. Additionally, 
the Constituent Assembly’s decision to forgo state institutions, including legislatures, 
precludes any study of the performance of parties at that level.  The electoral process 
featured single member districts, encouraging a two-party system, but candidates were 
nominated by parties, encouraging allegiance to the party over the constituency.166  To 
make analysis even more difficult, by the time the 1957 elections came about, multiple 
regions were embroiled in conflict, and political defections were becoming just as 
common, and just as damaging to the Union solidarity as the military sort.167 
Despite the inhibitions just mentioned, it is possible to make a few observations.  
One year prior to the 1957 elections, an opposition party, the National Unification Front 
(NUF), was created and that party successfully captured forty-three seats, indicating 
political space for a viable opposition party.  Minority-based parties secured thirty-eight 
seats, fourteen of which came in the United Hill People’s Congress Party.  Ten different 
organizations constituted the remainder of the minority seats acquired.  The quick 
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assembly and influence of the NUF indicated a system that rewarded the larger parties, in 
accordance with the expected effects of single member districts, but ethnic differences 
prevented consolidation of the numerous minority groups.168  As support for the 
primarily Burman-AFPFL continued to wane, dropping from 60 percent in 1951, to 48 
percent in 1956, ethnic parties remained autonomous, often shifting their support between 
rival Burman parties.  By 1960, the AFPFL had split, but one half, known as the Clean 
AFPFL, won the overwhelming majority of seats, as well as the support of most 
ethnically based affiliates and allies.  Burma’s political structure seemed to be tending 
toward a smaller number of parties, but through the initial democratic period political 
remained ethnically fractured and not polity-wide. 169 
4. Cumulative Analysis Using Stepan’s Model 
In retrospect, it is easy to see why scholars have considered Burma’s initial 
government in 1947 to be more unitary than federal. Maung’s narrative indicates that the 
participants of the Constituent Assembly had the best of intentions in unification, but the 
results missed that optimistic goal. Compared to Stepan’s article, the lack of a dedicated 
territorial legislative body was the most glaring omission, and as Henry Hale points out, 
“the core region … had no government and legislature of its own and was administered 
directly by the Union government and legislature.”170  Representation in the Union was 
carefully crafted, but the regional democracy was a forgotten but essential institution that 
existed for neither majority nor minority. Through strict application of the requirements 
set forth by Hale and Stepan, Burma’s government of 1947 failed to meet the most basic 
of criteria of representation in both a regional and central government, thus making its 
complex demos-constraining institutions futile and powerless. 
While the constitution generally succeeded in providing overrepresentation for 
minorities through the Chamber of Nationalities, the policy scope of that chamber was 
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sharply limited by its exclusion in financial matters.  The Chamber’s  veto powers were 
all but eliminated by the clause mandating combined chamber votes to settle 
disagreements between the assemblies.  Furthermore, the subunits of the federation, in 
this case the dual-hatted councils and ministers, had markedly limited authority, while 
unreserved powers defaulted to the Union. Given this assessment, and the economic, 
political, and ethnic environment in which it was introduced, failure was hardly 
surprising or unexpected. 
F. Fragmentation and Democratic Failure 
Democracy under the Union of Burma and the 1947 Constitution was short lived, 
as was the unity it was supposed to establish.  Burma’s situation was grim.  War had 
destroyed the countryside, the infrastructure, and the economy.  As Virginia Thompson 
lamented in 1948, “The world’s greatest exporter of rice was barely able to feed 
itself.”171  Crime was rampant.  In this difficult environment, political and ethnic unity 
fared no better.  Taylor summarized the political scene immediately following the 
constitution: “forces unwilling to accept their exclusion from state power in 1948 
launched the civil war in an attempt to achieve political power.”172  Armed ideological 
and ethnic opposition would plague the democratic Union over the duration of its 
existence.  In 1962 a coup led by General Ne Win ended Burma’s initial attempt at 
democracy and unity following independence.  In only fourteen years, democracy had 
failed.  As the previous section illustrated, the constitution largely falls short of Stepan’s 
criteria for federalism, but given the environment described above, it is difficult to 
ascribe democratic failure to any single cause.  The economic and physical condition of 
the country inhibited social services and economic growth, and the Union, still largely 
dominated by the Burman controlled-AFPFL, was beset by armed opposition and 
separatist groups before, during, and after the establishment of the constitution. 
The Union of Burma was anything but unified, and over the next decade, as this 
section will illustrate, Burma’s minorities abandoned the government in favor of armed 
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opposition.  Given the choice between participation in the Union or war against it, 
Burma’s minorities chose war.  The incomplete or limited participation of some 
minorities, such as the Karen and Arakan, added an initial degree of illegitimacy to the 
Union and its government.  Communist separatists labeled the AFPFL as traitors to their 
Do Bama Asaiyone roots and adopted the role of spoiler, and insurgent.  Those minorities 
that had more eagerly participated in the constitutional process, such as the Shan and 
Kachin, found themselves supporting a besieged government that increasingly abandoned 
constitutional principles in an effort to curb the insurgent threats surrounding it.  Because 
of insurgency and the state’s limited capacity, the sovereignty of the Union of Burma was 
weaker than the devolution intended by federalist design.  The Shan and Karenni actually 
found themselves under less central government oversight within the Union of Burma 
than they did as a Frontier Area under the British.173  Rangoon held little sway over the 
borderlands, and over the next ten years repeatedly “appealed to the people to stop paying 
taxes to the insurgents.”174   
1. Communism and Ethnicity 
Because of the challenges presented by the separatist Communist movement, 
many have blamed its existence, and the AFPFL’s inability to overcome it as the primary 
source of the Union’s early struggles. Others emphasize the already fragmenting ethnic 
arrangement that birthed insurgency groups and separatist movements in the Shan, Karen, 
Kachin, and Arakan regions of Burma. But as Smith highlights, the Union’s enemies and 
problems were not so easily categorized, and thus likewise for the AFPFL and subsequent 
central government entities to address: “In forty years of armed conflict, the ethnic and 
political insurgencies have crossed at so many points that it has become impossible to 
deal with any of the insurgent movements in complete isolation.”175 
The opportunism of both the CPB and ethnic minority groups was the primary 
cause of this confusion. The CPB courted ethnic alliances in an attempt to build a Maoist 
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United Front, while ethnic leaders willingly supported any group that furthered their own 
autonomy or separatist agenda. A common enemy facilitated cooperation, but dissimilar 
goals kept them from forming a lasting alliance. While the minority groups fought for 
their communities and their cultures, the CPB fought for ideology and revolution. These 
goals were not only dissimilar, they were also ultimately conflicting. As Smith notes, a 
successful communist revolution merely “represented an alternative face of Burman 
nationalism. It has long been accepted that the overthrow of any government in Rangoon 
might well mean the replacing of one Burman-dominated government with another.”176  
Understanding this perspective explains the minorities’ abandonment of the CPB in 1989, 
when ethnic forces, including the Shan, withdrew their support near the height of its 
influence in Burma, which in combination with decreased funding from Communist 
China, effectively commenced its collapse.177   
Whatever prospects the CPB had at uniting ethnic opposition in support of its 
cause were ultimately ruined by their actions. The ethnic misgivings and distrust of the 
CPB mentioned above were underscored by a lack of ethnic representation within its 
leadership, and the CPB commitment to power and revolution, with a complete disregard 
to development and enhancement of ethnic areas.178  The ideological commitments of the 
CPB, which refused to consider reserved ethnic participation and instead focused on class 
equality, disenfranchised the ethnic elites  When an alternative mode of opposition 
presented itself in the form of democracy, ethnic minorities sought influence there 
instead. As flawed and as illegitimate as that democracy proved to be, it still held more 
potential for influence and representation than any alliance with the CPB, the AFPFL, or 
any other Burman dominated organization ever could.179  
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2. Initial Fragmentation and Union Disenfranchisement 
The Union government did little to endear itself to its minority constituents in 
those early days of Burmese democracy.  The absence left by the assassination of Aung 
San left U Nu and General Ne Win as the most prominent leaders, but they lacked the 
reputation and the charisma Aung San had wielded before them.180  The AFPFL was 
always more than simply a political party, having its roots in a socialist ideology that 
encouraged party influence throughout society.  As political opposition grew, the AFPFL 
desperately attempted to maintain its hold on the government, leading to policies that 
ultimately provoked minority resentment within Burma.  One of the more incendiary 
policies was “Burmanization” which Geoffrey Fairbairn described in 1957 as “the 
packing of the administration with AFPFL supporters.”181  The motives were political, 
intending to secure control of the government from within and ensure continued 
influence, but to the ethnicities, it was no less than a purging of minority membership in 
the government.  Pessimistic fears were realized: the new Union was nothing more than 
another Burman oppressor.  From the perspective of Burma’s ethnic minorities, the 
Union, the AFPFL, and the tatmawdaw were one and the same.  They were all Burma.  
Opposing one was opposing all.182 
Three regions presented immediate ethnic opposition and insurgency: the Karen, 
Arakan, and Karenni.  Historically, the least likely of all ethnicities to be included in the 
Union of Burma had been the Karenni.  The Karenni had remained even more 
autonomous and independent during the colonial years than the Shan, and were 
previously not included in British colonial Burma.183  In contrast to the somewhat 
illegitimate Karen participations in the Constituent Assembly, the Karenni delegation was 
more representative of its people.  Despite missing the first two days of the assembly, the 
Karenni delegation succeeded, along with the Shan, in securing the greatest degree of 
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autonomy in the new Union.184  This participation, however, did not preclude 
independence movements within Karenni society which was unaccustomed to inclusion 
and potential repression under its Burman neighbors.  In September of 1946, the United 
Karenni Independent States Council was established, and the following year, only months 
after the establishment of the Union, one faction within that council unilaterally declared 
independence, and instigated a Karenni rebellion.  The Karenni rebellion was watched 
closely by other minorities who considered it a test case for future rebellions of their 
own.185 
The situation of the Karen was ironically in complete contrast to that of the 
Karenni, to whom they are ethnically very closely related.  The Karen were easily the 
most politically organized minority within Burma, but they were also the least committed 
and integrated in the Union. While the rest of Burma negotiated and drafted a 
constitution, the Karen continued to petition for a British protection and a mandate 
establishing a Karen homeland.  The Karen National Union (KNU) was established in 
early 1947 for that specific purpose.  It was a major political entity from its start, 
incorporating multiple Karen constituencies and already established Karen political 
groups, leading Smith to call it “by far the most influential of all the Karen political 
organizations.”186  Because of its British focus, the KNU did not represent Karen 
interests in the Union of Burma.  It boycotted the Constituent Assembly, and did not 
participate in the constitution’s creation.  The pleas to London went unanswered, and a 
comparatively poorly organized substitute, the Karen Youth Organization (KYO) took 
the KNU’s place.187  The result was that Karen support of the Union was never fully 
legitimized, and despite later attempts to provide regional ethnic autonomy, the Karen 
and the KNU were never effectively incorporated into the Union.188 
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The constitutional grievances of the Karen, including the lack of territorial 
accommodation, were well justified, even if they were a result of their own unwillingness 
to participate and negotiate with the rest of Burma’s ethnicities.  Greater grievance, 
however, is justified for the people of the Arakan region.  Similar to the Karen, the 
Arakanese had a powerful political body in the Arakan National Congress (ANC), but in 
pursuit of greater political influence, the members of the ANC chose to merge with the 
AFPFL in 1947.  Specific ethnic desires subsequently took a backseat to the AFPFL 
agenda, and the results were disastrous for both the ANC and the Arakan region.  At the 
Constituent Assembly, ANC members did not persistently lobby for ethnic privileges, 
and the Arakanese desire for regional autonomy was flatly rejected.189  The Arakanese 
did not receive any special privileges or concessions in the Burmese Constitution, and 
lost legitimacy amongst its constituency, as those that were supposed to represent 
Arakanese interests were instead focused on AFPFL political power.  The ANC’s fall 
simultaneously created a political vacancy and eliminated a unifying political 
organization. Ideological and religious factions ensued, with ethnic and religious violence 
soon after.  One of the largest remaining factions, the Arakan Leftist Unity Front 
(ALUF), led calls for increased autonomy and the elimination of taxes to the Union.  The 
political platform was popular, and radicalized into protests, strikes, and even ALUF 
sponsored violence.  Instead of concession or mediation, tatmawdaw personnel brutally 
suppressed the uprising, and created even more animosity.  The collective disorder in the 
region attracted the underground communist movements, and effectively turned the 
region into the stage for both ethnic and ideological conflict.190 
Conflict and insurgency in the Karenni and Arakan regions destabilized the 
government, but it was the defection and insurgency of the Karen that presented an 
existential threat to the new government.  In January of 1949, the bulk of the Karen 
personnel in the tatmawdaw  were playing a crucial role in the Union’s fight against the 
communist insurgency.  Upon hearing reports of irregular Burman troops conducting 
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indiscriminate killing and pillaging of Karen villages back in the center of the nation, all 
three Karen Rifle battalions abandoned the cause, and unbeknownst to the KNU, or 
Union and tatmawdaw leadership at the center, defected with the intent of rebellion.191  
The 1
st
 Kachin Rifles abandoned the anti-communist effort as well, and the loss of the 
four units was  crippling for the tatmawdaw.  The capital became vulnerable to both CPB 
and Karen capture. What had been loose, unofficial, and broken communication between 
the Karen political leadership and ethnically homogenous Karen military units 
now transformed into parallel, and increasingly coordinated opposition against the central 
government.192 
3. Expansion of the Opposition: Losing Shan Support 
The Kachin and Shan watched the unrest throughout the other frontier areas and 
within Karen-populated central Burma with extreme interest.  Interactions with other 
minorities had direct implication to their own relationships with the central government, 
but as participants and supporters of the agreements made at Panglong, they were hesitant 
to follow other minorities in opposition of the Union.193  The ethnic leadership, the 
sawbwas and chiefs, had always jealously protected their autonomy, guarding against 
early British and later Burman initiatives to reorganize the periphery in ways that would 
limit their influence.  This period was no different, and as a result, while political and 
military separatism lay dormant, there were overt attempts to reduce or eliminate 
economic dependence on the center.  Those attempts largely failed, and remain 
contentious issues to this day.194 
Opposition and insurgency pervaded the Shan State, but it was initially inorganic.  
The Shan State’s geographic location, natural resources, and the lucrative opium trade 
made it an enticing base for opposition groups.  As a result, it was the presence of the 
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CPB, the KMT, the Karen National Defense Organization, and Kachin opposition in 
Shan territory that compelled the national government to intervene militarily, and 
eventually led Rangoon to declare an emergency and the impose martial law in June 
1950.195  In comparison to other minority groups, Shan leadership remained the 
most committed to the Union through the first few years of democracy.  Nascent 
separatist movements started in the 1950’s but outright opposition was not present until 
November 1959.196 
During those years in which the Shan State was beset by anti-Union insurgencies 
and opposition groups, the government met with Shan sawbwas, interested in reducing 
their regional influence to facilitate stronger central control over the Shan State by the 
Union.  The Sawbwas participated in those discussions, largely believing that they held 
the ultimate power in any autonomy negotiations thanks to the constitutional right of 
secession.  In response to the secession threat, the Union began gradually stripping the 
sawbwas of their local influence and power, turning negotiations for political power into 
powerless hereditary titles and monetary compensation.  Callahan summarizes the Union 
efforts: “the Nu Government improved its bargaining position in these negotiations when 
it deployed the tatmawdaw throughout most of the region and had the army take over tax 
collection, social services, police forces, and other governmental services previously 
under the purview of the sawbwas.”197  The autonomy and administrative capacity of the 
Shan sawbwas, and consequently of the Shan people, was methodically stripped away.   
By 1953, the sawbwas accepted what they perceived as an unavoidable 
elimination of stature and gave up administrative authority, including judicial power, 
which the Shan had never historically relinquished, in exchange for financial 
compensation and the preservation of their titles.  Less than ten years after a constitution 
seemingly guaranteed regional administrative rights to one of Burma’s most independent 
minorities, Burman military forces became the primary providers of government 
                                                 
195 Callahan, Making Enemies, 156. 
196 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 190-91. 
197 Ibid., 158. 
 68 
services.198  Military administration in the Shan State resulted in ethnic violence.  The 
wife of a Shan sawbwa recalled the military administration, stating they, “behaved like 
ruthless occupation forces rather than protectors of the land.”199   
The results of these policies would be insurrection and opposition from the Shan, 
and subsequently the Kachin as well.  Both of these original participants in the Panglong 
Agreement had notably backed Union through several years of conflict and insurrection 
despite reduced autonomy and clear civil rights abuses at the hands of the Burman 
tatmawdaw.  Because of this, there is reason to believe that the agreements represented 
by Panglong and the 1947 Constitution may well have accommodated the Shan and 
Kachin.  Unfortunately, Union violence and administrative marginalization ruined that 
opportunity, and the two minorities which had so ardently supported the Union had now 
become its enemies.  Voluntary minority participation of the 1947 Constitution ultimately 
lasted only 14 years.200 
4. Democratic Failure and the Threat of Federalism 
The decline and eventual breakup of the AFPFL coincided with falling minority 
expectations of a united Burma under the framework of the 1947 Constitution.  By the 
time the AFPFL split in 1958, confidence in the government from even the most ardent 
Burman supporters was shattered.  Prime Minister Nu still held some charismatic appeal 
he gained as a former leader of Do Bama Asaiyone and as Thakin Nu alongside Aung 
San, but his decisions, which included concessions for Arakan, Mon, and Chin States 
were too late, too erratic, or lacked Union support to retain the support of Burma’s 
minorities.201  The AFPFL and the Union government split, more a victim of its own 
internal politics than of defeat from its external ideological and ethnic enemies.  The fall 
of the AFPFL was symbolically the end of the legacy left by its mastermind, Aung San, 
and without that legacy, the 1949 Constitution and the government it created was 
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meaningless, even for the Burman.  As Taylor asserts, “Ethnicity, religion, or 
Communism inspired more loyalty than did the state.”202 
The tatmawdaw, led by General Ne Win, took control in 1958 in the form of a 
two year “caretaker” government, and later executed a successful coup in 1962.  The 
motivation behind the takeover went beyond a quest for power.  The tatmawdaw saw the 
parliamentary democracy as ineffective and corrupt, and viewed itself as the 
suprapolitical actor necessary to end both the ideological and ethnic insurgencies.203   
Ironically, federalism became the trigger.  The threat of minority military cooperation had 
alarmed the military, but it was the Federal Movement, a late 1960’s minority movement 
for greater autonomy, and the “Federalist Seminar” of February 1962 that caused the 
military to act.204  Democracy and federalism were, in the eyes of the tatmawdaw, 
ineffective and incapable of uniting Burma’s fragmented populace.205  General Ne Win 
made his views clear that fateful morning of March 2, 1962: “Federalism is impossible; it 
will destroy the Union.”206 
5. Conclusion 
Burma’s leadership faced significant challenges in uniting an ideologically and 
ethnically fractured country under one government.  Armed with the Panglong 
Agreement and the legacy of the Government of Burma Act, 1935, the 1947 Constitution 
represented their best attempt at accomplishing the goal of Burmese unity.  But in the 
years between the creation of the 1947 Constitution and the coup of 1962, democracy 
never consolidated, and the country was more politically, ethnically, and ideologically 
fractured at the end of the period than it was at its beginning.  Therefore, by virtue of the 
outcome alone, the constitutional choices proved ineffective.  Stepan’s federal criteria 
offer explanations for the failure by highlighting the absence of an exclusive sub-unit 
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lawmaking body, and marginalized influence in the Union legislative system despite 
overrepresentation in the Chamber of Nationalities.  The constitution of Burma’s first 
democratic period fails the federal test, just as the government it created failed to 
accommodate Burma’s minorities. 
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IV. BURMA’S PRESENT: FEDERAL DESIRES AND THE 2008 
CONSTITUTION 
Prior to the loosening of civil liberties and the participation of Burma’s 
democratic opposition party, the NLD, within the government in 2012, few viewed 
Burma’s 2008 Constitution to be anything other than empty rhetoric.  Ridicule of the 
government’s 2003 “seven-stage roadmap” towards “building a modern, developed and 
democratic nation,”207 was justified, given the continued disregard for political and 
individual freedoms prior to reform.  The constitutional referendum of 2008 and the 
election of 2010 were neither free nor fair and indicated little break from the totalitarian 
past.  Now, however, as the National League for Democracy (NLD) functions as a 
legitimate opposition party within government, skepticism and disregard of the 
constitution seems out of date.  This chapter will evaluate the 2008 Constitution and its 
prospects for accommodating and incorporating Burma’s minorities.  It will begin with a 
brief summary of the interaction between the tatmawdaw (military) and Burma’s 
minorities since 1962.  The contemporary conditions and demands of Burma’s minorities 
will be reviewed, and the constitution will be analyzed, once again using Stepan’s criteria 
for effective ethnofederalism.   
A. Historical Background (Post Democracy) 
Burma’s ethnic minorities have faced the spectrum of human rights violations 
since 1962.  The tatmawdaw and its government have been repeatedly chastised by the 
international community, but such accusations have not altered their behavior, nor 
improved the lives of their victims.  Because of this, it is unexpected that any minority 
group would remain willing to consider inclusion in a government dominated by the very 
people that perpetrated the crimes, but Burma’s minorities largely remain committed to 
the idea.  The following section chronicles the history of governance in Burma, 
highlighting the degree of ethnic participation since the coup of 1962, and outlining the 
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minorities’ physical experiences since that time.  A review of contemporary ethnic 
political demands sets the stage for evaluating the 2008 Constitution and its potential for 
meeting those desires and accommodating Burma’s minorities. 
1. Ethnicity and Government Since 1962 
At the completion of the 1962 coup, General Ne Win and his cohorts set up the 
Revolutionary Council which held complete power throughout all levels of government.  
The Council and the government it established was, at least in theory, based along 
socialist ideals called the “Burmese Way to Socialism.”  Such an ideological basis 
justified the government to intrude and invade into all aspects of society.  Federalism, 
autonomy, and administrative independence were eliminated.  Ethnically sensitive 
matters such as education, music, and dance became subject to government prohibition, 
and control over publishing ensured control over the media and the maintenance of 
language.  The Council sought to eliminate ethnically based rights and privileges, 
preaching, “equal rights and equal status for all minority groups.”  The point, however, 
was not democratic liberalism, but rather the elimination of concessions and 
accommodation for Burma’s minorities.  The ethnic councils established by the 1947 
Constitution were abolished and replaced with centrally appointed administrations.  
Taylor summarizes the Council’s desired end state: “The effect of the Revolutionary 
Council’s policies was to eliminate ethnicity as a constitutional issue and replace it with 
more tractable ones such as regional development and cultural diversity.”208   
In 1974, the Revolutionary Council introduced Burma’s second constitution.  The 
1974 Constitution largely justified and affirmed the actions already executed by the 
Revolutionary Council, and established a strong central government, controlled 
administratively by the military down to the village level.209  It established the Pyithu 
Hluttaw, a unicameral legislative chamber that functioned similarly to other socialist and 
communist regimes’ legislative bodies.  Only members of the military’s Burma Socialist 
                                                 
208 Taylor, The State in Burma, 294-301. 
209 Ibid., 303-304. 
 73 
Program Party (BSPP) participated, and those members were chosen by the party, not the 
populace.  The constitution also officially established separate new states, including the 
Mon State, the Chin State, and the Arakan State.210  Despite the ethnic attachment of the 
territories’ names, the point was not increased ethnic accommodation, but structural 
reorganization.  The country was divided into seven states and seven divisions (See 
Figure 4), and 72 percent of the population, which translated to 66 percent of the seats, 
lived within the Burman dominated divisions.211  Even if democratic elections did take 
place, representation within the unicameral legislature would have been overwhelmingly 
Burman.212  As Silverstein assessed in 1977, the goal was “direct control over the entire 
nation through a strong and disciplined administrative structure.”213  The 1974 
Constitution was overtly central.  
The political dominance of the military through the BSPP remained largely 
unchallenged until the famous 8888 Democratic protests on August 8, 1988.  The BSPP, 
renamed as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), aggressively 
suppressed the uprising, imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi, suspended the 1974 Constitution 
and reinstated martial law.214  General Saw Maung, the tatmawdaw Chief of Staff, 
announced impending elections, and followed through with that promise, which 
surprisingly resulted in free and fair elections.  The NLD dominated those elections, and 
the new military party front, the National Unity Party (NUP) was utterly defeated.215  In 
response the military nullified the elections, ensuring that the NLD never attained power.  
From that point, until 2011, the military would continue to rule by martial law.216 
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In 2003, during the midst of the military junta’s governance, the SLORC 
announced its seven step roadmap for democratization, which consisted of reconvening 
the National Convention, taking steps to ensure emergence of a genuine democratic 
system, drafting of a new constitution, adopting that constitution through national 
referendum, free and fair elections for the legislative bodies, convening of the 
legislatures, and the building of a modern democratic nation by state leaders elected by 
the legislature.218  These steps were regarded by foreign and domestic observers as empty 
promises which at best would result in façade democracy similar to the socialist period 
that preceded it.219  International criticism of the military government during that time 
largely focused on its treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.  This fact did not go 
unnoticed by the minorities.  One ethnic minority leader expressed his exasperation in 
1996 saying, “When several hundred NLD supporters were recently arrested, there was 
much international concern, but fortunately most have been released.  In ethnic minority 
areas, however, our people are still being killed every day, and thousands of people are 
being forced from their homes.  It does not attract anything like the same degree of 
attention.”220   
Because of the focus on Burma’s civil and political right abuses, the participation 
and inclusion of Burma’s minorities in the seven step process has often been dismissed 
along with the process itself.  This is despite the fact that one of the world’s longest 
running insurgencies, the Karen, participated in the first step: the reconvening of the 
National Convention.  At that convention, a thirteen party multi-ethnic coalition 
submitted proposals for a federal union.  Even though these proposals were rejected, 
participation in the process was seen by the minorities themselves as more potentially 
significant and influential than a return to insurgency.221  They reasoned that to have a 
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constitution and a government was better than recent experiences in which the regional 
military commanders persecuted them without the rule of law.  They concluded that even 
a defective constitution could be amended.  The Karen specifically recalled the 
consequences of their Constituent Assembly boycott in 1947 as motivation to participate 
this time.  As Tom Kramer wrote in 2009, “the Karen could not afford to remain outside 
of the political process, albeit a flawed one.” 222 
The constitutional referendum and the elections of 2010 were globally regarded as 
neither free nor fair, but the participation of Burma’s minorities in the election was 
significant, as were the results.  Seventeen ethnic minority parties won seats within state 
or Union government, and in four of the minority states, those parties won over 25 
percent of the vote, conferring several constitutional rights.223  The Transnational 
Institute rightly assesses the importance of minority presence in the Union government, 
stating that it is not the degree of influence that matters, but instead emphasizes the 
significance as, “the presence of elected representatives of minority ethnic populations 
who are able to actively discuss the key local issues, be they social, cultural economic, or 
political.”224  While the world largely condemned the SLORC’s seven steps, many of 
Burma’s minorities decided a seat at the table, however marginalized it might be, was 
better than exclusion and continued insurgency. 
2. Beyond Governance:  The Consequences of Ethnicity in Burma 
The previous section summarizes Burma’s governance and minority participation 
since 1962, but ethnic interaction was hardly limited to the political sphere.  Following 
the coup, General Ne Win attempted to negotiate an end to the ethnic and ideological 
conflicts throughout Burma.  Those efforts proved futile and the fighting resumed.225  
Facing numerous armed groups in different locations throughout the country, the 
tatmawdaw took steps to increase its own capabilities and undermine the capacity of its 
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opponents.  By modernizing and restructuring, the military was able to gain a 
technological advantage over its opponents that resulted in near immediate results, such 
as defeating the US supplied Kuomintang in the Shan State.226  The tatmawdaw then 
divided the country into military regions, and gave regional commanders great freedom 
and authority within those regions to eliminate insurgencies.227  In this limited oversight, 
human rights abuses and corruption multiplied.228 
The country’s military divisions did not significantly alter the minorities’ 
experiences.  The tatmawdaw counterinsurgent policy, called “Four Cuts” mandated 
separating insurgent groups from sources of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits.229  
This policy promoted and justified increasingly brutal tactics by the military, resulting in 
the types of reports mentioned in the Karen human rights book, Suffering in Silence, 
published in 2000.  Rape, burnt villages, confiscated food stores, mutilated livestock, and 
indiscriminate killing became standard occurrences in the ethnic periphery.230  By several 
accounts, including Callahan and Hazel Lang, who wrote on the Burmese refugees in 
Thailand, the tatmawdaw goal was closer to depopulation than it was to suppression.231 
The armed insurgent groups held varying control of the regions furthest from the 
Burmese capitol and were able to use the people and resources of that region to varying 
degrees.232  Those groups remained largely isolated, however, and nearly as ignorant of 
the plights of their neighbors as central Burmans were of their fellow countrymen in the 
hills.233  In 1989, following the “8888” protests and subsequent crackdown, the 
insurgency situation in Burma took another turn, with the collapse of the Communist 
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Party of Burma (CPB).  Without Chinese support, the CPB was highly reliant upon its 
ethnic hosts in the peripheral regions of the country.  When the minorities withdrew their 
support, anticipating the possibility of democratic opposition, the CPB fell.  The long-
awaited elimination of the military’s ideological rival facilitated a change in ethnic 
minority insurgency negotiations.  Over the next few years, the government negotiated 
cease-fire agreements with the Wa, Kachin, Mon, and Karen.234  While peace was and is 
still yet to be negotiated, the cease-fires gave many of Burma’s minorities the time and 
opportunity to participate politically. 
In some respects, the cease-fires have come to represent a devolved power 
relationship between the government and political representation of the minorities.  In 
some areas, ethnic insurgents have kept their weapons and act as internal police, which 
the government has attempted to adopt into regional, ethnically homogenous “Border 
Guard Force.” 235  It is not uncommon for tatmawdaw forces to leave their weapons at the 
edge of the controlled region before entering into it. 236  Callahan’s view of the cease-
fires is somewhat ironic, given the focus of this thesis: “In some respects, through its 
seventeen cease-fires, the SLORC/SPDC constructed a novel approach to federalism.”237 
3. The Contemporary Grievances and Desires of Burma’s Ethnicities 
The “spirit of Panglong” still resonates loudly within the hopes and demands of 
Burma’s ethnic minorities.  In Panglong, minorities remember the voluntary negotiation 
between equals, but most importantly  “Full autonomy in internal administration for the 
Frontier Areas”238  In 1947, minorities agreed on a construction of government that was 
intentionally federal.239  In 1976, an eleven party coalition drafted and proposed 
federalism.  Once again in 2008, a multi-ethnic alliance, the United Nationalities 
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Alliance, proposed a more federal union, and opposed the proposed constitution because 
it did “not include the federal union concept.”240  The United Nationalities Federal 
Council, which claims the support of the major Karen, Shan, Karenni, Mon, Arakan, and 
Chin political fronts was established in 2011, desiring the establishment of a “Federal 
Union guaranteeing freedom, justice and equality for lasting and peaceful co-
existence”241  Similarly, the Ethnic Nationalities Council, the successor of the NDF, aims 
for “a genuine Federal Union” to “guarantee…self-determination.”242 Federalism may 
have been absent in all three of Burma’s independent constitutions, but it remains at the 
heart of Burma’s minority demands.  The following sub-sections briefly identify the 
contemporary demands, from the mission statements of the politically coordinated Karen, 
to the unheard plights of the Rohingya. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Burmese minority demands is their 
consistency.  In 1950, Saw Ba U Gyi established the four main principles of the KNU as 
no surrender, recognition of the Karen State, retain arms, and self-determination.243  
Those four principles remain unaltered, appearing on KNU’s official website along with 
the following mission statement, “To establish a genuine Federal Union in cooperation 
with all the Karen and all the ethnic peoples in the country for harmony, peace, stability 
and prosperity for all.”244  Despite over sixty years of opposition, oppression, and 
immeasurable human rights abuses at the hands of the tatmawdaw have not changed the 
desires of Burma’s Karen people.  The story resonates similarly with the Kachin, the 
Shan, the Mon, the Chin, and the Arakan.  It is self-determination that they desire, and 
federalism is their preferred means of achieving it. 
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B. The Constitution: Construction, Institutions, and Relationships 
1. We the People: The Preamble 
In contrast to the 1947 Preamble which seemed to search for popular justification, 
the Preamble of the 2008 Constitution attempts to build a historical narrative of unity that 
predates imperialism.  It states, “Myanmar is a Nation”245, rather than suggesting the 
joining of separate nations such as the Shan and Karenni under a unifying framework.  It 
emphasizes a historical pattern of “living in unity in oneness,”246 and blames past failures 
on external influences and unfortunate circumstances, such as the need for a hastily 
prepared constitution in 1947 to support independence timelines. The predominant theme 
is unity, despite the exclusivity expressed in Article 450 which succinctly states:  
“Myanmar [Burmese] language is the official language.”247  “Similarly, it is to be the 
only language through which the constitution it so be legally interpreted.248  The 
Preamble claims that, “National races representative of all townships in the Nation took 
part in the National Convention.”249  It calls on its citizens to “uphold racial equality, 
living eternally in unity,”250 clearly placing the onus of unity upon Burma’s minorities, 
rather than the government that unifies them. 
One phrase is introduced in the Preamble and repeated throughout the 
constitution: “non-disintegration of the Union, [and] of National Solidarity”251  Non-
disintegration, more than any other notion, defines the focus of the constitution. This 
language is repeated sixteen times, included in the Oath of Affirmation, justifying martial 
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law, and outlawing political parties whose platforms oppose these ideals.252  While the 
constitution establishes separate states for Burma’s national races, and guarantees 
representation for minorities with a certain population percentage, all of these “multi-
National”253 principles are tempered by a powerful emphasis on national unity. Any 
divisive threat is deemed illegal, and carries consequences that include the restriction of 
liberty and freedoms with tatmawdaw intervention. 
2. State Formation 
Burma is divided into “Seven States and Seven Regions of equal status 
established under current names.”254  The previously established states for the Shan, 
Karen, Karenni, and Kachin are retained, along with new Chin, Mon, and Rakhine States. 
This, combined with Burma’s official recognition of seven National races incorporating 
the one hundred thirty-five ethnicities, effectively establishes a state for each of Burma’s 
major ethnic divisions. The Burman dominated areas are broken up into regions, notably 
a decision Hale would recommend in a case of a dominant majority, such as this one.255  
The result is the heavily Burman populated Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, Ayeyawady, 
Bago, Magway, and Taninthayi Regions. The states and the regions are given identical 
rights and representation within the government, much of which will be discussed in the 
following sections.256  Changes to the boundaries of these territories require the approval 
of the national legislature, known as the Union Assembly (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), which 
comprises both the lower house and the upper house; such changes also require the 
approval by one-half of affected region’s populace.257  The Union, however, maintains 
the final word, and can override the regional preference with a vote of more than three 
quarters of the Union Assembly. Moreover, secession is explicitly prohibited, which  
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further restricts the rights of the states and reinforces the principle of non-
disintegration.258 
Three distinct levels of government are established:  The Union, the States and 
Regions, and Self-Administered Areas. In a divergence the 1947 Constitution, each state 
and region is prescribed its own legislature (Hluttaw), meaning that representative 
legislative bodies are solely dedicated to the territories they govern, and the members of 
those bodies have no connection or responsibilities within the Union.259  Self-
Administered Areas are set up for distinct sub-ethnicities within states and regions that 
have a population of at least ten thousand. The elected leader of that Area is additionally 
guaranteed representation within the state or region legislatures.260 
3. Fundamental Rights 
The fundamental rights and liberties listed in Chapter I and Chapter VIII are 
befitting of any contemporary democracy. The freedoms of expression, assembly, 
association, language, literature, and culture seem to foster a free and open democracy in 
which ethnic diversity would be welcome. Since 2008, however, those freedoms have not 
always materialized, largely due to the constitutional commitment to non-disintegration 
and national solidarity. To this end, there are several clauses that insinuate limitations or 
restrictions to fundamental rights. The freedom of religion, for example, is contingent on 
“order, morality or health,”261 clearly leaving interpretive room in its implementation. 
More explicitly, however, occurrences of foreign invasion, insurrection and emergency 
justify the suspension of the personal liberties and rights described in Chapter VII.262  
Multiple and repetitive times within that chapter, the citizenry of Burma is charged with 
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the responsibility to safeguard national solidarity,263 independence and sovereignty,264 
non-disintegration,265 and “unity among the national races.”266 
As a commitment to the ethnicities and cultures of its inhabitants, the Union 
commits to “assist in the development of language, literature, fine arts and culture of the 
National races, “ to “promote socio-economic development including education, health, 
economy of less developed National races,” and to promote “solidarity and mutual 
amity.”267  All of these commitments, and all of the liberties and rights previously cited, 
are once again subject to an emergency clause, which justifies sweeping civil liberty 
restrictions, and establishes the military as the protector, and justifies the implementation 
of martial law. The significance and consequence of the emergency clause within the 
constitution, and thus the government it established, has been the focus of much 
opposition and criticism, seemingly establishing a legal justification for another military 
coup. The clause, introduced in Chapter I reads, “If there arises a state of emergency that 
could cause disintegration of the Union, disintegration of national solidarity and loss of 
sovereign power or attempts therefore by wrongful forcible means such as insurgency or 
violence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services (CinC) has the right to take 
over and exercise state sovereign power in accord with the provisions of this 
constitution.”268 
The provisions on the “State of Emergency” are further outlined in Chapter XI, 
which is in fact, dedicated to the topic. In that Chapter, the responsibilities and authority 
of the military is clearly outlined. If the president believes that an emergency that 
threatens the unity of the Union, his emergency declaration and subsequent ordinance 
will establish a full year of military administration.269  The legislative functions of the 
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Hluttaw are suspended, and all legislative, executive and judicial power, also later 
referred to as all “sovereign power,”270 is transferred to the military and the CinC.271  
Most importantly, “The Commander in Chief of the Defense Services may, during the 
duration of the declaration of the state of emergency, restrict or suspend as required, one 
or more fundamental rights of the citizens in the required area.”272  Democracy in Burma 
is but one presidential proclamation away from termination. 
4. Burma’s Legislature: The Hluttaw’s 
The national legislature, known as the Union Assembly (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), 
was designed as a bicameral legislature.  In the lower house, known as the House of 
Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw), seats are allocated mainly according to population.  In 
the upper house, known as the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw), each state and 
region has an equal number of seats.273  At first glance, this seems to mirror the attempts 
in 1947 in establishing a representative body with increased minority influence alongside 
a more directly representative body. There are, however, several differences which limit 
the minorities’ influence within the legislatures themselves, and consequently in the 
Union in general.   
The first aspect that limits minority influence is this: every legislature includes 
guaranteed, centrally appointed membership for the military.274  The CinC, a position 
notably separate from the presidency, is responsible for directly appointing military 
representatives to each of Burma’s law-making bodies. This military representation 
comprises either one-fourth or one-third of the representatives, meaning that greater than 
a quarter of Burma’s lawmaking institutions have no direct responsibility to its 
constituents, and instead answer only to the tatmawdaw.275  It is a significant restraint on 
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representative democracy, justified by the military’s self-proclaimed existence 
transcending divisive politics and as the protectorate of Burma’s unity.  Regardless of the 
motivations, however, the continued Burman domination of the tatmawdaw forces 
Burma’s minorities to interpret the military allotment as insurance for Burman 
domination, rather than a check on ethnic or party politics. 
The House of Nationalities was designed to function much like the U.S. Senate. 
Each state and region was given twelve seats in the legislature, resulting in 168 regionally 
elected representatives.  This effectively made the upper house the legislature with 
democratically imbalanced ethnic representation, similar to its predecessor, the Chamber 
of Nationalities.  Fifty-six additional seats, representing one-quarter of the assembly, are 
reserved for military appointment by the CinC. Essentially this construction reserves 
eighty-four of the 224 seats, or 37.5 percent, for Burma’s ethnic states, a dramatically 
smaller number than the 57 percent that was reserved for the ethnicities themselves in the 
1947 Constitution. Burma’s seven ethnic minorities constitute roughly 27 percent of the 
population, meaning that the House of Nationalities essentially provides only 10 percent 
increased influence for ethnic minorities.276 
The House of Representatives, like the Chamber of Deputies in the 1947 
Constitution, is the legislature designed to be more directly representative of Burma’s 
population, prescribing 330 seats to electorates based on population and townships. It is 
logical to assume that ethnic minorities have genuine opportunities to win seats within 
the House of Representatives, but those chances would be far less than their proportion of 
the electorate because so many members of minority groups live in Burman-majority 
while few Burmans live in minority-dominated areas.  One hundred ten seats were added 
for CinC appointment, similarly resulting in one-quarter of the House of Representatives 
membership.277  The House of Representatives operates separately from the House of 
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Nationalities, but in the case of disagreement between the two bodies, the entire Union 
Assembly, literally a joint session of the two assemblies, will decide the matter.278 
Burma’s state and region legislatures constitute separate and distinct legislative 
bodies for each territory, which is a divergence from the precedent set in 1947. These 
bodies hold the tightest relationship with their constituencies, and subsequently should be 
expected to represent the most obvious materialization of ethnic representation in 
government. It is in these legislative bodies that every ethnicity is constitutionally 
mandated representation, provided it constitutes 0.1 percent of Burma’s population. The 
sizes of these legislatures were not constitutionally defined, but like the Union Assembly, 
these regional bodies also had an appointed military component, with one third of the 
seats reserved for CinC nominations. The ramifications of the military provision are 
staggering. Ethnic parties need to win more than three-fourths of the democratically 
available seats to constitute a majority within their own territorial assemblies.279 
5. Burma’s Executive:  The President 
Burma’s chief executive, the president is the head of government and head of 
state. The 1947 Constitutional position of prime minister, which had held few distinct 
powers and served mostly an advisory role, was eliminated. The president is elected from 
an electoral college made up of the representatives that constituted the Union Assembly, 
making it similar to the electoral process of the US president.280  Overall, the executive 
enjoys much greater influence in the current government than what the position had been 
previously assigned. While the president still has little veto power over Union Assembly 
legislation,281 he is once again given power to act without legislative approval in the case 
that the legislature is not in session, or emergency situations justify it. His ordinances can 
last up to sixty days without legislative approval.282   
                                                 
278 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter IV, Art. 95, 137, 157. 
279 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter IV, Art. 161. 
280 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter III, Art. 60. 
281 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter IV, Art. 105, 106, 107.   
282 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter V, Art. 212. 
 87 
The power of the Presidency is increased to two different ways. First, the 
executive is not only the head of the Union, but of the states and regions as well.283  The 
Union Government includes the ministers of the Union, who function as the executive 
branch of the states and regions. These ministers are appointed by the president and 
answer directly to him, rather than to the territorial constituency over which that minister 
presides.284  Similarly, the Civil Services are not a power delineated to the states and 
regions, but instead fall directly under the president and the Union government. The 
heads of those services, which include the administration of districts and townships and 
the “Myanmar Police Force,” are appointed by the president.285 
The second manner in which the executive was strengthened was in appointment 
authority. In 1947 the president also held vast appointment powers, but those powers 
were checked by the combined approval of the legislative chambers. The same 
widespread appointment authority remains and even expands to include the Supreme 
Court, the attorney general, the auditor general, the state and region chief ministers, and 
the heads of civil service. The president’s choices, however, can no longer be rejected by 
the legislature, except for failure to meet the prescribed criteria which constitutes little 
more than age and experience restrictions.286  All told, only the president, the vice-
president, and the representatives constituting the Hluttaws have an origination outside of 
the president’s dominion.  
The presidential oath affirms commitment to the “non-disintegration of the Union, 
non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty,”287 and indeed 
many of the charges and responsibilities listed directly facilitate that end. His powers are 
not only laterally extensive across the Union, but also carry significant depth, including 
the ability to dictate and specify state and region ministries. He is not only empowered to 
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choose the number size and shape of those ministries; he is able to choose who 
administers them. 
6. Burma’s Judicial Branch 
The construction of the Supreme Court is little changed from the construction of 
1947. As the highest judicial authority in the land, the Supreme Court is the court of final 
appeal and has jurisdiction over any dispute between states, regions, and the Union.288  
As previously mentioned, the justices, numbering from seven to eleven, are nominated by 
the president to the Pyidaungsu which has “no right to refuse the person 
nominated…unless it can clearly be proved that the persons do not meet the 
qualifications for the post.”289  The qualifications listed include extensive experiential 
credentials, an age between fifty and seventy years old, and a freedom from party 
politics.290 
The Union’s influence over the courts does not end at the Supreme Court,  The 
Chief Justices of each state and region are also nominated by president, and the state and 
region Hluttaws are, just like their Union counterparts, powerless to object to those 
nominated.291  Those regional Chief Justices supervise the remainder of the courts within 
the state or region, and as a result, the courts within each subunit remain largely centrally 
controlled, rather than locally administered.292  
In addition to the court system, Chapter VI also establishes the Constitutional 
Tribunal of the Union, which is tasked to “interpret the provisions of the constitution,” to 
judge laws of both the Union and the regional Hluttaws compliance with the 
constitution,” and “to decide constitutional disputes between Union and region or region 
and region.293  Three candidate members of the Tribunal are provided from the House of 
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Nationalities , the House of Representatives, and the president.294  Those candidates are 
supposed to be adopted as the president’s nominations, which, similar to his other 
nominations, cannot be rejected by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for anything other than 
failure to meet the requisite qualifications.295  The president alone selects and approves 
the replacement member if one of them is found to be constitutionally unqualified for 
membership on the Tribunal.296  All told, the Constitutional Tribunal represents another 
presidentially appointed Union institution with powerful influence over the whole 
country, including the states and regions. 
7. Delineating Power: Legislative Lists 
Just as in 1947, power and jurisdictions not explicitly listed in the constitution are 
reserved for the Union. This is openly stated in Chapter III, which reserves all legislative 
powers “relating to other matters not enumerated in the legislative list of the Union, 
region or state”297 to the Union and the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Similarly, any law passed 
by the territorial legislatures that is in conflict with Union legislation is disregarded:  
“The law enacted by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw shall prevail.”298 
The Union and Territorial Legislative Lists are quite extensive nonetheless. 
National defense, foreign relations, and economic policies are naturally reserved for the 
Union. In addition to these typical sectors, several lines stand out as specifically notable 
inclusions that facilitate the removal of historically important insurgent sustaining sectors 
from ethnic control. Among these are nearly all natural resources including gems, forests, 
minerals, and international trade duties, all of which have helped ethnic insurgencies fund 
their campaigns.299  These choices clearly indicate a desire to limit insurgency resources 
and justify tatmawdaw acts preventing their use by insurgent groups. 
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In addition to establishing the Union’s economic dominance over legislation and 
funding, the list delineates a Social Sector that is extensive, and encompasses much of 
civil service and administration, from education curricula and standards, to security and 
police operations. In contrast, the region or state legislative list is much smaller. The 
permitted economic legislation is in fact dependent upon Union legislation to authorize 
it.300  The most ethnically sensitive legislative authorities are excluded.  Ethnic minorities 
in Burma may have been given territorial accommodations, but within those territories, 
there is no control over schools, civil service, language, culture, police, or courts.  
Autonomy seems more nominal than actual. 
C. Analyzing the Constitution 
Is it federal?  For Stepan, federalism requires a constitutionally guaranteed division 
of authority between separately elected national and subnational political bodies, and he 
argued that such guarantees are only possible under a legitimate constitutional democracy.  
Recent reforms have implied increasing fulfillment of that requirement, but military 
representation in the legislatures remains constitutionally protected, as does the re-
implementation of martial law under the emergency clause.  Still, the federal relationship 
between the central government and the sub-units does exist and once again requires an 
analytical application of Stepan’s criteria and variables.  This section constitutes a federal 
analysis of the 2008 Constitution, beginning superficially with basic definitions, and then 
studying the constitution using the structure of Stepan’s criteria and variables. 
1. Superficial Evaluations:  Symmetrical and Unitary 
Taylor and Silverstein assessed the 1947 Constitution as more unitary than 
federal, based on limited state legislative powers, few state tax or finance rights, and 
limited practical autonomy.301  In these terms, the 2008 Constitution is even more 
unitary.  The economic and financial capacities of the states and regions are even more 
limited, the legislative lists are substantially shifted in favor of the Union, and autonomy 
                                                 
300 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Schedule Two, Art. 2. 
301 Taylor, The State in Burma, 227; Silverstein, “Politics in the Shan State,” 48. 
 91 
is limited to the legislative bodies, which are only two-thirds autonomous in themselves 
thanks to the military component that is constitutionally mandated. Given these general 
observations, it is unlikely that Taylor or Silverstein would view the 2008 Constitution as 
more federal than the 1947 constitution. 
Once again, despite the obvious federal institutional structures imparted, the term 
federalism is not mentioned in any part of the document.  While state formation explicitly 
defines sub-units of government, the federal term is notably absent.  This is similar to the 
1947 edition, but remains a stark contrast to ethnic minority groups’ mission statements.  
The KNU for example espouses a “Federal Union based on democracy and self-
determination.”302  The constitution is clearly inspired by federalist principles forming a 
“Union of Myanmar,” but the focus is not on the federal term or principle.  Instead of the 
1947 Constitutional prose promoting the unification of multiple nations, this 2008 
Constitution emphasizes the integrity of the Union, a narrative of “peaceful coexistence,” 
and a commitment to national solidarity and state sovereignty.303 
Amoretti’s criteria, briefly mentioned in Chapter III, mandate “an institutionalized 
division of power between a central government and a set of constituent governments.” 
This criterion is clearly met and with much more clarity than it had been in 1947.  States 
and regions are clearly defined, and the relationships between territories and the Union 
are explicitly spelled out. Amoretti’s second criterion is more difficult to fulfill.  Amoretti 
prescribes that “each level of government has the power to make final decisions in some 
policy areas but cannot unilaterally modify the federal structure of the state.”  The limited 
legislative scope of the states and regions makes qualification in this criterion imprecise. 
Furthermore, the powers reserved for the Union, including the emergency clause, pave 
the way for central unilateral modification of the relationship and structures of the 
government and its constituent governments.  The division of power, while present is 
undermined by the lopsided nature of the policy scope and lack of subunit executive 
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control.  The 2008 Constitution appears federal, but does not grant enough 
constitutionally protected power to the subunits to truly qualify. 
The regional breakdown of the states and regions is distinctly federal, and the 
division of the Burman populated areas would be appreciated by Henry Hale, who 
suggests that an ethnofederal arrangement with a single dominant region amidst minority 
states is prone to collapse.304  The divided Burman regions may encourage regional 
politics amongst the Burman majority and further stabilize the relationships between the 
Burmese ethnicities.  But such a symmetrical construction infers other consequences as 
well.  Burma’s legislative and electoral college similarities with the United States amplify 
the perception that the 2008 Constitution is more of a civic federalist model, drawing 
upon the racial equality theme of the 1974 Constitution, rather existing as genuine 
ethnofederalist accommodation.  As Stepan suggests, this symmetry counters the normal 
construction of successful federal models in multinational countries.305 
2. Stepan’s Criteria 
Stepan’s defining criteria and variables are once again used to judge the federal 
viability of Burma’s attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict within its borders.  Stepan first 
and foremost mandates that the Constitution must be a constitutional democracy.  The 
presence of unelected military appointees within each legislative body clearly violates 
democratic principles and further limits ethnic minorities’ influence within both the 
House of Nationalities and the state legislatures.  Looking beyond the military quotas and 
their effects, the constitution and the institutions it defines seem to fit this prerequisite.  
Stepan’s first criterion states that the government should have “territorial political 
subunits whose electorate is exclusively drawn from citizens of the subunit and that have 
areas of legal and policy-making autonomy and sovereignty that are constitutionally 
guaranteed.”306  Burma’s political subunits are clearly designated, and their constituents 
exclusively elect members of both a territorial subunit legislature, as well as a Union 
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assembly. The presence of the tatmawdaw within the state legislatures betrays this 
principle, however, infecting state and region politics with Union influence.  Burma’s 
Constitution fails Stepan’s defining criteria, and does so because of the military’s 
unelected presence within the legislative bodies. 
Secondly, Stepan asserts that a federal government must have a “state-wide 
political unit, which contains a legislature elected by the statewide population, and which 
has some law and policy-making areas that are constitutionally guaranteed to fall within 
the sovereignty of the statewide body.”307  Whereas the 1947 Constitution fell short in 
providing a regionally dedicated political unit, including a legislature, the 2008 
Constitution meets all of these criteria. The scope of the constitutionally guaranteed law 
and policy areas is certainly worth discussion, and will factor into some of the variables 
below, but in terms of meeting the institutional prerequisites, the latest Burmese attempt 
meets the standard. 
3. Stepan’s Variables 
The first of Stepan’s four variables is the degree to which minority regions are 
overrepresented in the territorial chamber.308  The House of Nationalities , by virtue of its 
territorial representation quotas, fits this description.  In the description of this institution, 
it was shown that ethnic representation would likely be no greater than about 37.5 
percent. This is only 10 percent greater than the actual population of Burma’s minorities. 
They are overrepresented, but only marginally so.  Symmetry exists in this contemporary 
constitution that was not present fifty years prior.  The 1947 edition presented a definitive 
asymmetrical quality. Ethnicities in Burma enjoyed comparatively different 
accommodations within the federal system. Territorial accommodation was unequal 
between Burma’s minorities, as were representative quotas within the Chamber of 
Nationalities.  The majority Burman population received no guaranteed influence, other 
than their majority status within a democratic government.   
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In contrast, the 2008 Constitution presents what Stepan would call a symmetrical 
federal system.  No constitutional differences exist “between the legal status or 
prerogatives of different subunits within the same federation.”309  The regions and states 
enjoy the same rights and influence within government.  Stepan asserts that durable 
federal democracies in multinational states are asymmetrical, and that symmetrical 
federal democracies are successful in only mono-national situations.  The reason is that 
symmetry potentially eliminates key demos-constraining qualities that could be present 
within the most important structure of a federal democracy, the territorial legislature.  
The asymmetry in 1947 provided veto power for the combined representation of the 
Shan, Karen, Kachin, Karenni, and Chin against the Burman majority.  United, those 
ethnicities commanded more than half of the Chamber of Nationalities, and thereby had 
what Stepan refers to as “blocking power” constitutionally guaranteed.310  In contrast, the 
symmetry of the 2008 Constitution, reduces the combined influence of seven ethnic states 
to exactly half of the elected seats, eliminating any veto capacity for Burma’s minorities.  
The mandatory military presence further dilutes minority influence, turning the House of 
Nationalities  into yet another institution with likely Burman domination. 
Secondly, Stepan looks to ascertain the policy scope of the territorial chamber.311  
The House of Nationalities  has little difference from its counterpart, the more directly 
representative House of Representatives. In fact, aside from differences in qualification 
criteria, the functions and policy scope of the two legislatures is practically identical. In 
the previous constitution, the Chamber of Nationalities had been excluded from monetary 
legislation, but in this case, the territorial chamber is not limited or restricted in policy 
scope.312 
Stepan’s third variable focuses on the constitutional allocation of policy making 
to the subunits of the federation, further breaking the analysis into three separate 
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components.313 First, what “exceptional law-making majorities”314 are required for 
specific legislation. There are two instances when legislation ultimately requires more 
than 50 percent of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The first of these requires than any change to 
state or region territorial boundaries requires the approval of one half of affected region’s 
populace. This requirement, however, is overridden by more than 75 percent approval in 
the Pyidaungsu.315  The second manifestation of a necessary super majority is applied to 
amendments to the constitution. Such legislation requires 20 percent of the Pyidaungsu 
Hluttaw to submit the bill for consideration, and more than 75 percent approval to be 
ratified. Amendment of particular sections additionally requires the approval of a nation-
wide referendum.316 
A comparison of the powers reserved for the Union with those powers reserved 
for the states and regions reveals significant disparity. On a superficial scale, one hundred 
twelve legislative powers are reserved for the Union, while only forty-one are reserved 
for the states and regions. The numbers, however, hardly illustrate the power disparity. 
Judicial law, Police and security matters, the civil service sector, and educational 
legislation are all reserved for the Union. The sectors reserved for the territorial units 
largely constitute areas left over or are explicitly dependent on Union legislation to 
authorize them.  Emphasizing the preeminence of the Union, all unreserved powers 
default to Union control. 
Stepan’s fourth variable seeks to measure to what degree the party system is 
polity-wide.317  In contrast to 1947, the existence of representative assemblies at the state 
level provides the encouragement of ethnic specific party formations, and likewise 
provides an analytical basis from which to gauge how Burma’s Constitution encourages 
or discourages polity wide parties.  Union legislative and presidential electoral 
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similarities with U.S. institutions help provide an expectation.  The electoral method of 
selecting both the legislative representatives and the chief executive are nearly identical, 
as is the commitment to and electoral process favoring single member districts.  In the 
mono-national U.S., this construction results in extreme polity wide parties creating a 
strong two party system. While Burma’s ethnic landscape makes direct correlation 
impossible, many of the incentives should remain.  In contrast to the democratic period of 
1947-62, coalitions and umbrella groups unite many of the ethnic minorities into larger, 
and more influential entities.  Several of those coalitions ran as political parties in 2010, 
with moderate success, thereby inferring a possibility of a polity-wide minority party. 
While there may be a temptation to view the NLD as a polity wide and ethnic 
inclusive party, the stark differences in political agenda give pause. While both ethnic 
parties and the NLD take exception to portions of the 2008 Constitution, notably the 
military representation within the Hluttaws, there is little else incentivizing consolidation 
or amalgamation.  Ethnic minority groups supported the CPB when it suited their needs, 
but ultimately abandoned the communists because it represented nothing more than 
another form of Burman-dominated governance.  The NLD is itself a Burman-dominated 
party that primarily campaigns for civil liberties and increased liberalization, not 
increased ethnic autonomy.  To become a polity-wide party, Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
NLD will have to specifically target and campaign for ethnic minority support by 
supporting minority demands in addition to their own traditional democratic platform.   
Ultimately, the structures and incentives are present to encourage polity wide 
party activity, but the effects may not be seen for some time.  The general election of 
2015 will likely reveal the extent to which polity-wide parties have successfully attracted 
the interest and support of Burma’s minorities.  The 2010 election and ethnic parties 
tendency to form alliances rather than support nation-wide political parties, however, 
indicates that the party system remains regional and fractured, and likely to remain so in 
the near future. 
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4. Cumulative Analysis Using Stepan’s Model 
The 2008 Constitution fails the basic criteria set forth by both Stepan and 
Amoretti, primarily due to the existence of the military representation in the legislatures.  
Further evaluation using Stepan’s variables furthermore reveals that it falls short of 
constituting the type of federal system necessary for holding together a multi-national 
state.  The primary deficiency of 1947, the absence of dedicated territorial legislatures, is 
not repeated in this constitution, which clearly provides political representation in both 
the central government and its subunits.  The deficiencies of the contemporary 
constitution instead largely present themselves in the allocation of powers between the 
Union and the territorial subunits, and in the centralized control of the territorial 
administrations and civil services.  Executive power within the territories is not elected. It 
is appointed from the center, and while Stepan’s criteria have limited analysis of 
executive powers, the president’s authority in this manner violates the principle of 
constitutionally guaranteed subunit sovereignty.318 
Furthermore, the constitutional inclusion of the military in all of the legislatures 
not only marginalizes ethnic minorities’ control of their legislative bodies, but also limits 
the effectiveness of the key demos-constraining intuition: the House of Nationalities.  
Disagreements between the two legislative houses results in a combined vote, which 
would probably silence minority legislative opposition, but the inclusion of the military 
essentially prevents ethnic minority blocking power within the House of Nationalities.  
Thus, there are multiple impediments to ethnic accommodation within the Union 
government.  Cumulatively, there are far too many deficiencies to suggest that the 2008 
Constitution can be a federal solution to the accommodation of Burma’s minorities. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has evaluated the viability of Burma’s 2008 Constitution and the 
government it establishes as an accommodation of Burma’s ethnic minorities.  It has done 
so by presenting the historical basis for identity and autonomy within Burma’s minorities, 
and comparing the 2008 arrangements to the ones that were laid down in the 1948 
constitution.  In each case, this thesis has assessed the institutions for governing ethnic 
minority regions against the criteria for successful ethnofederalism as described by 
Alfred Stepan.  In doing so, it concluded that the 2008 Constitution does not define a 
federal state, and thus cannot be regarded as a potential federal accommodation of 
Burma’s minorities, even though it establishes territorial subunits in which ethnic 
minorities are dominant.  Highlighting similarities and differences offers further insight 
as to why Burma’s minorities share the same view and continue to push for a more 
federal state.  This first part of this chapter will draw conclusions based upon the 
similarities and differences between the two eras, as well as predictive outcomes based on 
the historical precedent.  The second part of this conclusion introduces and highlights an 
unforeseen result of liberal reforms.  The contemporary plight of the Rohingya and the 
religious-based conflict that seems to have resulted from their unwanted presence and 
relaxed civil liberties, offers further opportunity for the study of Burma’s ethnic conflicts, 
and the prospects for lasting peace. 
A. Federalism in Burma: The Minorities’ Unfulfilled Desire 
1. Similar Constitutional Shortcomings 
In 1993, Donald Horowitz wrote, “Constitution makers in new democracies have 
often been content to restore the very institutions that were conducive to the previous 
ethnic breakdown.”319  The similarities between the 1947 Constitution and the 2008 
Constitution could inspire Horowitz to repeat his statement with added evidence.  
Structural similarities abound, including the bicameral legislature and most positions of 
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government.  This section will focus instead on the similarities of two components which 
undermine both constitutions’ functional capability for incorporating and accommodating 
minorities.  They are the emergency clause, which is remarkably resilient, present in all 
four of Burma’s constitutional iterations, and the joint assembly method for resolving 
disagreements between the Union parliamentary chambers. 
The emergency clause, first introduced in the Government of Burma Act, 1935, 
gave the British governor the authority to abandon diarchy by dissolving the Burmese 
legislature, and then govern the colony in an autocratic manner.  The executive power 
inherent in the emergency clause was reduced in the 1947 Constitution, but the clause 
remained, providing a constitutional basis for denying the rights and privileges that the 
constitution otherwise promised.320  In the initial democratic period, this emergency 
clause was applied in the Shan State in response to the many insurgent groups that 
resided there.  The result of that decision was the alienation of the Shan leadership, the 
sawbwas, which had previously been one of the Union’s most steadfast supporters from 
the minority community.  The description of the clause expanded in the 2008 
Constitution and went to great lengths to describe the duration and function of martial 
law in the event an emergency was declared.321  To say that the emergency clause 
undermines the intent of the constitution is not enough.  In Burma, emergency clauses 
and martial law have been real, the threat remains real, and a constitutional justification 
for them significantly marginalizes the remainder of the constitution. 
The second similarity concerns the manner in which disagreements between the 
Union legislative bodies are decided.  In both the 1947 Constitution and the 2008 
Constitution, a disagreement between the lower house and the upper house was resolved 
through a joint session and a collective vote.322  The practice sounds democratic, using 
majority rule to settle disputes.  In an ethnofederal arrangement, however, in which ethnic 
minority influence in one of the chambers is increased relative to its population to 
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provide veto powers, such a practice dilutes the influence of minority representatives and 
effectively cancels the benefits they gained through overrepresentation in the upper 
house.  Numerically speaking, even in the best scenario, in which the military no longer 
has reserved seats and minorities are able leverage their entire population to secure the 
maximum representation their populations can achieve, representatives from minority 
regions would command no more than two-fifths of the combined house seat count.  
Because of this, there is truly no demos-constraining functionality within the legislatures, 
then or now. 
2. Differences, But Not Necessarily Improvements 
The failure of the previous democratic period should have compelled the writers 
of the 2008 Constitution to improve upon the 1947 version, lest they produce the same 
result.  Several of the differences between the documents reflect the writers’ desire to 
prevent Burma’s return to the politically and ethnically fractured condition of the 1960s:  
increased the power and influence of the executive, equal representation and territorial 
accommodations to the ethnic minorities, limited policy scope of those territorial units, 
and reserved military personnel within the both the Union and sub-unit legislatures.323  
Only one of these changes, the territorial accommodations, could be construed as an 
improvement over the federal structure of the 1947 Constitution.  The others clearly 
inhibit democracy and federalism; they are intent on maintaining a military presence and 
ensuring all of government and society are monitored and influenced by the executive 
branch of the Union government.  The result is a truly unitary government.  Minorities 
have a dedicated legislative body, to govern their territories, but those legislatures are 
marginalized by the inclusion of military representatives, and have little actual power, 
overshadowed within their own territory by an executive government that is centrally 
appointed. 
The overall effect is a marked decrease in the autonomy and self-government 
enjoyed by Burma’s minorities as well as a decrease in their influence on and security in 
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the Union government.  Without control over the sensitive issues such as language, 
culture, and education, there is little impetus for the minorities to accept the current 
constitution.  With this in mind, it is little surprise that minority demands still revolve 
around the concept of federalism, refusing to accept the 2008 Constitution as a true 
reflection of a federal state. 
B. Ethnic Peace and Conflict in Burma’s Future 
From the perspective of Burma’s minorities, the 2008 Constitution is flawed, but 
that has not inhibited their participation in the constitutional drafting process, and the 
elections that followed it.  Whether compelled by “battle fatigue,” as suggested by Zaw 
Oo and Win Min or by a genuine desire to be a part of a flawed system rather than left 
outside of it, as the Karen have suggested, most minority groups have chosen to 
participate in it.324  Cease-fire agreements, however, have yet to be solidified into peace 
agreements, and minority groups retain their arms, facilitating a return to violence such as 
that seen most recently witnessed in the Kachin State.  A new cease-fire has been 
implemented there, but the failure of the previous cease-fire, which had lasted seventeen 
years prior to the outbreak of violence in June of 2011, demonstrates the tenuous nature 
of minority agreements with the Burmese government.325  Without constitutional change, 
Burma’s minorities will continue to be deprived of political influence relative to their 
Burman countrymen.  Ethnic peace and the maintenance of cease-fire agreements largely 
rely upon minority patience and willingness to seek those federal demands 
democratically.  If their demands continue to go unanswered, conflict seems more likely 
than peace. 
A constitutional amendment then becomes the key to federal prospects for ethnic 
peace within Burma.  First and foremost, for the 2008 Constitution to become acceptably 
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democratic, military representation in the legislatures would have to be removed.  
Furthermore, to meet the federal demands of Burma’s minorities, states’ rights would 
have to be markedly increased.  State legislatures’ policy scope would have to be greatly 
increased, and the executive governments of each sub-unit would have to be locally 
selected, rather than centrally appointed.  Constitutional reform is, however, unlikely, as 
the size of the legislative military quotas specifically inhibit the three-quarters majority 
needed to amend the constitution.326  Even if the opposition groups such as the NLD and 
ethnic minority parties successfully swept the entirety of the elected Union Assembly 
seats in 2015, it is unlikely that a single military representative would vote to eliminate 
the tatmawdaw’s place in government.  Burman NLD representatives could be a powerful 
ally, but one that would most likely continue to focus on the consolidation of democracy 
and civil liberties instead of minority desires such as increased state and region powers.  
In short, even if the military party is swept from government, the constitutional changes 
necessary to create an effective ethnofederal state are unlikely to occur. 
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